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UNION RIGHTS, NO DUES: IN RE EPILEPSY FOUNDATION AND 
THE NLRB’S EXTENSION OF WEINGARTEN RIGHTS TO 
NONUNION EMPLOYEES 
Consider the following scenario: a nonunion employee is accused of 
pushing his supervisor after a heated exchange.  The only parties present 
during the dispute are the supervisor, the accused and a coworker-witness of 
the accused.  Both employees are known to be extremely hostile toward their 
supervisor because of recent departmental changes.  To avoid collusion 
between the two friends, upper management wishes to interview each 
employee individually to ascertain the facts surrounding the incident.  The 
accused refuses to meet with upper management alone and requests the 
presence of the coworker-witness at the meeting.  When the accused continues 
to refuse meetings with upper management, he is discharged for gross 
insubordination. 
Until the recent decision by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or 
Board) in In re Epilepsy Foundation of Northeast Ohio,1 the company would 
have been on solid ground in refusing the employee’s request.  The Board’s 
holding in Epilepsy Foundation now requires an employer to grant a nonunion 
employee’s request for a coworker’s presence at investigatory meetings where 
the employee reasonably believes that discipline may result.2 
Few employee relations professionals in a union-free environment realize 
the protections of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act) extend to 
nonunion employees.  For the past fifteen years, these protections have been 
almost exclusively in the area of union organizations.3  The seed for extending 
 
 1. In re Epilepsy Foundation, Nos. 8-CA-28169 and 8-CA-28264, 2000 WL 967066 
(N.L.R.B. Jul. 10, 2000). 
 2. Id. 
 3. This is not surprising considering the wording of the Act.  The preamble of the Act 
states: 
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain 
substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these 
obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of 
collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of 
association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, 
for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other 
mutual aid or protection. 
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1994).  See also John D. Canoni, Non-Union Employees Are Entitled To Have A 
Coworker Present At Investigatory Interviews, at http://www.lawmemo.com/emp/articles/ 
nonunion.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2000). 
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these protections to nonunion employees was planted in the Supreme Court’s 
NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc. decision.4  There, the Court held that an 
employee’s request to have a union representative present during an interview 
must be granted if the employee reasonably believes the meeting will result in 
the imposition of discipline.5  Basing its decision on Section 7 of the Act, 
which guarantees employees the right to “engage in concerted activity for the 
purpose of . . . mutual aid and protection,”6 the Court noted that “Weingarten 
rights” would help to level the playing field between employers and 
employees.7  To hold otherwise, the Court noted, would be a direct 
contradiction of the purpose of the NLRA.8 
This Note will examine the rationale of previous Boards and the current 
Board in their interpretation and application of Weingarten rights in a 
nonunion setting.  Part I focuses on pre-Weingarten decisions by the Board, 
outlines the provisions of the NLRA that are relevant to this Note and 
discusses the congressional intent surrounding those provisions.  Part II details 
the Court’s decision in Weingarten and the establishment of Weingarten rights.  
This section also examines the pivotal Board rulings after Weingarten, 
interpreting these rights as they pertain to nonunion employees.  Part III 
analyzes the Board’s decision in Epilepsy Foundation.  Included in this section 
will be an examination of Members Bremer and Hurtgen’s persuasive 
dissenting opinions. Part IV concludes that although a permissible 
interpretation of the Court’s decision in Weingarten, the majority’s holding in 
Epilepsy Foundation is not the most desirable.  The Board’s determination that 
nonunion employees have an unfettered right to have another employee present 
during an investigatory interview imposes upon the employer the duty to deal 
with nonunion employees as a collective unit, a result not supported by the 
NLRA. 
I.  PRE-WEINGARTEN 
The Board has by no means been consistent in its interpretation of the 
NLRA with regards to union representation at investigatory meetings.  The 
Board’s first interpretation occurred in 1945 in Ross Gear & Tool Co.9  Ross 
Gear involved a dispute between female nonunion, nonsmoking employees 
and their female union counterparts who had recently been given permission to 
 
 4. 420 U.S. 251 (1975). 
 5. Id. at 267. 
 6. Section 7 provides that “[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, 
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own 
choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other 
mutual aid or protection.”  29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994). 
 7. Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 262. 
 8. Id. 
 9. 63 N.L.R.B. 1012 (1945). 
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smoke on the shop floor like their male coworkers.10  The female advocate of 
the extension of the smoking policy to females also served as recording 
secretary for the union.11  As a result of her championing the smoking policy 
change, numerous altercations erupted between her and her nonunion 
coworkers.12  Management and the union bargaining committee met with the 
employee and discussed the problems that were occurring on the shop floor.13  
The employee, fearful that she was going to be terminated, requested union 
representation at the meeting.14  The employer refused and subsequently 
informed the employee that she would be terminated if she would not meet 
with him alone. The employee again refused to meet without union 
representation and was discharged for insubordination.15 
The Board, while not deciding the specific issue of union representation at 
a disciplinary meeting, nonetheless held that the employer’s actions in refusing 
to deal with the union violated the employee’s rights guaranteed under Section 
7 of the Act.16  The Seventh Circuit refused to enforce the Board’s order.17  
The court disagreed with the Board’s finding that the employee had been 
discharged for anything other than insubordination for refusing to attend a 
meeting with her supervisor without the presence of the entire bargaining 
committee.18  The court then went on to emphasize that the meeting between 
the employee and the company was merely investigatory and that no grievance 
had at that time been filed.19  That being the case, the court determined that the 
employer’s refusal in no way restrained or interfered with the employee’s 
Section 7 rights.20  Thus, under the court’s analysis, the only meetings that 
would mandate union representation were those meetings held to discuss a 
formal grievance.21 
The Board did not deal with the issue of union representation at 
disciplinary meetings until some twenty years later in Dobbs House, Inc.22  
This case involved the termination of an employee several job infractions after 
 
 10. Id. at 1022. 
 11. Id. at 1021-22. 
 12. Id. at 1023. 
 13. Id.  This meeting was actually called in order to attempt to bargain a new labor 
agreement.  The problems with the smoking policy were discussed at this meeting.  Id. 
 14. 63 N.L.R.B. at 1025. 
 15. Id. at 1028. 
 16. Id. at 1034. 
 17. 158 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1947). 
 18. Id. at 613. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. 145 N.L.R.B. 1565 (1964). 
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being previously disciplined on numerous occasions.23  The employee 
requested and was denied union representation when discussing the allegations 
with her supervisor.24  The Board, in affirming the Administrative Law Judge’s 
(ALJ’s) findings that the employee was not entitled to union representation, 
stated that nothing in the Act obliges the company to grant an employee’s 
request for union representation in every situation where an employee is 
subject to discipline.25  The Board stated that this was especially true in the 
situation at hand because the conduct for which the employee was disciplined 
was not related to any protected union activity.26 
The Board changed course three years later in Texaco, Houston Producing 
Division.27  This case again presented an employee who was refused union 
representation at an interview held by the company to investigate an alleged 
theft by the employee.28  The Board distinguished its decision in Texaco, 
weighing that the employer was not merely investigating the incident, but 
meeting to get information already adduced “on record” in the event that 
discipline was imposed.29  Under these circumstances, the Board reasoned that 
the employer clearly intended to deal directly with the employee concerning 
his terms and conditions of employment.30  As such, the Board found the 
employer’s denial of the request that a union representative be present at the 
meeting concerning the suspension interfered with the employee’s rights 
guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act.  The Board held that the company had 
violated Sections 8(a)(1)31 and 8(a)(5)32 of the Act by its refusal to bargain 
collectively with the representatives of his employees.33 
 
 23. Id. at 1569.  The case provides no information concerning the reason for the disciplinary 
actions taken against the employee. 
 24. Id. at 1570-71 
 25. Id. at 1571.  The court stated, “An employer undoubtedly has the right to maintain 
day-to-day discipline in the plant or on the working premises and it seems to me that only 
exceptional circumstances should warrant any interference with this right.” 
 26. Id. 
 27. 168 N.L.R.B. 361 (1967). 
 28. Id. at 361. 
 29. Id. at 362. 
 30. Id. 
 31. When an employer commits an unfair labor practice, it violates Section 8(a).  Section 
8(a)(1) prohibits an employer from interfering with the exercise of rights by employees which are 
guaranteed under Section 7.  This provision is very broad and encompasses all Section 8 
violations.  Thus, whenever there is a violation of Sections 8(a)(2), (3), (4) or (5), a violation of 
Section 8(a)(1) is also committed.  Section 8(b)(1) declares it an unfair labor practice “to interfere 
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in” Section 7 of the 
Act.  See supra note 6.  A Section 8(a)(3) unfair labor practice is committed when an employer 
discriminates against employees regarding terms and conditions of employment in order to 
encourage or discourage union membership.  Likewise, Section 8(a)(4) prohibits discrimination 
against an employee for filing a charge with the N.L.R.B.  29 U.S.C. § 158 (1994). 
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The Board’s decision was based primarily on its finding that the 
employer’s purpose in meeting with the employee was to complete its case 
against the employee to justify disciplinary action.34  The Board’s finding of an 
8(a)(5) violation was grounded in this factual determination.  It reasoned that 
the employer’s intent in calling such a meeting was to deal directly with the 
employee concerning terms and conditions of his employment.  Hence, the 
company’s refusal to deal with the employee’s selected union representative 
concerning his terms and conditions of employment was clearly a refusal to 
bargain collectively.35 
The Fifth Circuit reversed the Board’s decision in Texaco.36  While the 
court relied primarily on a different interpretation of the facts, it also based its 
decision, in part, on a finding that whether a meeting requires the company to 
grant an employee’s request for representation is determined by the purpose of 
the meeting.37  The Fifth Circuit’s decision differentiated between meetings 
with employees to investigate the employees misconduct and those meetings 
with the sole purpose of administering discipline.38 
The court’s reliance on the underlying purpose of the meeting as governing 
whether union representation requests must be granted was supported by two 
earlier Board decisions: Chevron Oil Co.39 and Jacobe-Pearson Ford.40  In 
Chevron Oil, the Board upheld the trial examiner’s determination that the right 
to union representation at an employer-employee meeting did not arise until 
two things occured:  (1) a management decision was made that would 
somehow adversely impact an employee’s terms and conditions of 
employment; and (2) the management decision must be on the verge of 
implementation.41  Finding that neither event had occurred, the Board held the 
 
 32. Section 8(a)(5) which makes it illegal for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively 
with representatives selected by the majority of employees over terms and conditions of 
employment.  29 U.S.C. § 158 (1994). 
 33. Texaco, 168 N.L.R.B. at 362. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id.  The Board stated that management’s refusal to deal with the union in this instance 
“transgressed its statutory obligation to bargain with the union concerning the terms and 
conditions of employment it represents.”  As such, the Board found the employer’s refusal of 
representation to be violative of Sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5). 
 36. 408 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1969). 
 37. Id. at 144.  The court’s ruling upheld the Board’s determination that an employer is not 
required to provide union representation for all dealings with employees that may ultimately 
affect terms and conditions of employment.  Id. 
 38. Id.  “[S]ince the interview dealt only with eliciting facts and not with the consequences 
of the facts revealed, its subject matter was not within the scope of compulsory collective 
bargaining.”  Id. at 145. 
 39. 168 N.L.R.B. 574 (1967). 
 40. 172 N.L.R.B. 594 (1968). 
 41. Chevron Oil, 168 N.L.R.B. at 578. 
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employer did not violate the Act when it met with the employee without a 
union representative.42 
In Jacobe-Pearson Ford, the Board found that a meeting scheduled with 
an employee to discuss a potential insubordination incident was merely to elicit 
the employee’s side of the story and did not require the employer to submit to 
the employee’s request for union representation.43  The Board found that the 
company had made no decision to discipline the employee at the time of the 
investigatory meeting and had promised the union that it would explain any 
determinations made as a result of information obtained at the meeting with the 
employee.44  Echoing its decision in Chevron Oil, the Board stated, “in view of 
the absence of any definite adverse action taken . . . and [the company’s] 
willingness to explain and bargain with the union any disciplinary decision 
made, [the company] did not breach any statutory obligation in denying union 
representation . . . at the fact-finding meeting.”45 
II.  THE MODERN DOCTRINE 
Following the Fifth Circuit’s ruling in Texaco and the Board’s decisions in 
Chevron Oil and Jacobe-Pearson, it appeared that the right to union 
 
 42. Id. at 579.  Chevron Oil had a bifurcated review system.  When an issue arose that was 
deemed to warrant discipline, a fact-finding meeting was scheduled with the employee whose 
alleged misconduct was at issue.  The employee was told that he was not obligated to say 
anything at the meeting but it was understood that if the employee failed to explain his conduct 
that management was free to rely solely on the facts relayed by the foreman reporting the 
incident.  The employee was also told that the purpose of the meeting was to gather information 
to enable management to make a determination as to whether discipline was appropriate.  The 
management personnel in attendance at the fact-finding meetings had no authority to administer 
discipline.  As such, union representation was not necessary at this step of the process. 
  Once the company reached the decision to take disciplinary action, the company 
scheduled a disciplinary meeting with the employee and his union representative.  The company 
would lay out its case for the employee and the representative.  Anyone in attendance at this 
meeting could comment, attempt to clarify or modify any facts relating to the case at hand.  If 
persuaded by the union’s arguments the company could forego punishment entirely or if 
unconvinced could proceed as planned and mete out the discipline.  Id. at 577. 
 43. Jacobe-Pearson, 172 N.L.R.B. at 594-95.  An employee in the automotive shop was 
found to have turned away an end-of-day job that would have potentially required the employee 
to remain at work past his quitting time.  Instead, the employee left work fifteen-minutes early.  
The next day the employee came to work and found his timecard pulled.  The employee testified 
that because of the pulled time card he feared that he was being discharged.  As such, when 
management requested to meet with him to discuss the previous day’s incident the employee 
asked that a union representative be present.  The request was denied.  Id. 
 44. Id. at 595. 
 45. Id.  As the trial examiner pointed out, however, the true intent of the company in 
requesting the meeting is factually unknown.  The meeting with the employee never took place 
and thus the question of “whether or not the proposed interview with [the employee] was an effort 
to deal with him concerning the terms and conditions of employment can never be established 
with any certainty.”  Id. at 599. 
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representation at employer interviews hinged upon the narrow distinction 
between investigatory and disciplinary interviews.46  This standard led some 
commentators to the conclusion that the Board’s distinction was illusory at 
best.47 
A. An Evolving Standard 
The trial examiner in Texaco, Inc., Los Angeles Sales Terminal, finding the 
Board’s new standard unworkable, developed a new test for determining an 
employee’s rights to union representation.48  He proposed a test that shifted the 
focus from the employer’s professed purpose for the meeting to the objective 
manifestation of that purpose.49  In fashioning this new standard, the trial 
examiner noted the Board’s recent use of an “either/or” classification system 
was flawed in that many situations would not fall into either category.50  He 
proposed, and the Board endorsed, an objective test where the “statutory 
rights . . . vest or materialize when management’s course of conduct . . . 
provides objective manifestations sufficient reasonably to justify the 
conclusion that a disciplinary reaction . . . will be forthcoming.”51 
Three years after Los Angeles Sales Terminal, Mobile Oil Corp. came 
before the Board.52  Mobile Oil involved five employees who were suspected 
 
 46. See David L. Gregory, The Employee’s Right To Representation During Employer 
Investigatory Interviews: A Critical Analysis Of The Evolution Of Weingarten Principles, 28 
VILL. L. REV. 572, 581 (1983); Theodore C. Hirt, Union Presence In Disciplinary Meetings, 41 
U. CHI. L. REV. 329, 332 (1973).  The Board’s distinction between investigatory and disciplinary 
meeting is ambiguous.  Since the employer had not yet determined that discipline was 
appropriate, the meeting was necessarily investigatory.  This subjective test will require a case-
by-case review and will rely on the “behavior and intent of the employer, with conjectural 
inferences from ambiguous actions.”  Hirt, supra, at 332.  It may also be surmised that the 
Board’s attempt to limit an employee’s right to representation to only disciplinary meetings 
demonstrates the Board’s concern that to hold otherwise would allow representation in all run-of-
the-mill meetings thus potentially disrupting the employer’s operations.  Id.; see also Joan 
Torzewski, Employee Right To Union Representation During Employer Interrogations, 7 U. TOL. 
L. REV. 298, 305-06 (1975) (noting that the Board’s lack of a definitive standard leaves 
employees in a quandary in that they could never be certain that their assessment of the likelihood 
of discipline would be accepted). 
 47. See Torzewski, supra note 46, at 306-07.  The Board’s distinction was in many ways not 
meaningful in that the Board, in many cases, was turning a blind eye to the fact that many times 
the employer already had all the information needed for a disciplinary decision.  As such, the 
interview was being conducted merely to confirm these facts.  The Board also seemed 
uninterested in the fact that, although the employee was granted union representation in the 
disciplinary meeting, the employee was usually denied the benefits of a de novo meeting.  Id. at 
307. 
 48. Los Angeles Sales Terminal, 179 N.L.R.B. 976 (1969). 
 49. Id. at 983; see also Gregory, supra note 46, at 582. 
 50. Los Angeles Sales Terminal, 179 N.L.R.B. at 982-83. 
 51. Id. at 983. 
 52. 196 N.L.R.B. 1052 (1972). 
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of stealing company property.53  The employees were interviewed by the 
company’s security agents without benefit of union representation.  Based on 
information gleaned from these interviews, the employees were discharged.54 
The trial examiner found that the employer’s refusal of union 
representation did not violate the Act because the interviews were not being 
conducted to support a predetermined disciplinary action.55  As such, the trial 
examiner concluded that there could be no violation of sections 8(a)(1) and 
8(a)(5) of the Act.56 
The examiner’s reliance on the Chevron Oil and Jacobe-Pearson 
distinction between investigatory and disciplinary interviews was rejected by 
the Board.  It concluded that an employer’s refusal of an employee’s request to 
union representation when the employee reasonably believes that information 
solicited at the interview could have an adverse affect on his employment 
violates that Act.57  An employee’s request in such situations is premised on 
Section 7 of the Act which guarantees the right of employees to act in concert 
for mutual aid and protection.58  Consequently, an employer who violates an 
employee’s Section 7 right by refusing to provide union representation also 
violates sections 8(a)(1) of the Act.59 
The Board did not, however, find a violation of 8(a)(5) as in the past.60  
The Board had previously held that under Section 8(a)(5), management had a 
duty to bargain with the union regarding disciplinary matters because such 
discussions implicated terms and conditions of employment.61  Thus, the 
Board’s refusal to find a violation of Section 8(a)(5) essentially eliminated the 
need to differentiate between investigatory and disciplinary meetings.62 
The Seventh Circuit refused to enforce the Board’s decision in Mobil Oil.63  
The court found the type of activity complained of, union representation at 
investigatory meetings, was not intended to be covered by Section 7.64  The 
 
 53. Id. at 1059.  The five employees consisted of four bargaining unit employees and one 
supervisor.  Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 1060. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Mobil Oil, 196 N.L.R.B. at 1052.  In so finding, the Board found that the four employees 
knew they were suspected of theft and it was therefore a reasonable assumption that the 
company’s interviews could possibly lead to their termination.  Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. See supra note 31. 
 60. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 61. See supra notes 27-35 and 39-45. 
 62. Gregory, supra note 46, at 585. 
 63. Mobil Oil Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 482 F.2d 842 (7th Cir. 1973). 
 64. Id. at 847.  “A fair interpretation of the broad purpose and language of Section 7 
persuades us that the novel ‘right to representation’ recognized by the Board in this case is not a 
‘concerted activity’ within the meaning of the Act.”  Id. 
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protections intended by Section 7 of the Act were only intended to “enable 
employees to organize and to apply economic pressure against their employers 
in appropriate situations.”65 
B. The Supreme Court’s Endorsement of a New Standard 
In International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union v. Quality 
Manufacturing Co.66 and N.L.R.B. v. Weingarten,67 the Supreme Court was 
presented with the issue of whether an employer’s discharge of an employee 
for refusing to meet alone with the employer violated the Act.  The Court 
addressed and endorsed the test first set forth by the trial examiner in Los 
Angeles Sales Terminal.68 
1. Quality Manufacturing Co. 
In Quality Manufacturing,69 an employee requested her union 
representative be present in a meeting with her employer to discuss a work 
stoppage she had instigated in protest of the employer’s piece-rate wage 
system.  After the employee refused to meet alone with the employer on 
numerous occasions, the employee was terminated.70 
The Board began by distinguishing the issue presented in Quality 
Manufacturing from that of previously decided cases.71  It noted that Quality 
Manufacturing represented the first case in which an employee had been 
discharged for insisting on union representation at an employer investigatory 
interview.72  Further, the Board had never considered the Section 7 rights of 
individual employees to act in concert “for mutual aid and protection.”73 
The Board struck a balance between the employee’s rights and the rights of 
the employers.  Where an employee reasonably believes that the interview will 
have an adverse effect on his employment, participation in the interview is 
 
 65. Id. at 846-47.  The court stated that had Congress intended Section 7 protections to 
extend to employees who fear reprisal from an employer meeting, that interpretation would have 
been recognized long ago.  Id. at 848. 
 66. 420 U.S. 276 (1975). 
 67. 420 U.S. 251 (1975). 
 68. See supra notes 49-51. 
 69. 195 N.L.R.B. 197 (1972). 
 70. Id. at 197-98. 
 71. Id. at 198.  See also Gregory, supra note 46, at 587 n.104 (noting that while the Board 
was correct in distinguishing the Board’s previous decisions, it failed to address Ross Gear, a 
case in which the factual situation was the same).  See Ross Gear, 63 N.L.R.B. 1012 (1945). 
 72. Quality Mfg., 195 N.L.R.B. at 198. 
 73. Id. 
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voluntary, unless a union representative is permitted to be present.74  Where 
not permitted, the employee may opt to forego the interview entirely.75 
The Fourth Circuit disagreed with the Board’s decision and refused 
enforcement.76  In particular, the court took exception to the Board’s view that 
this case was one of first impression.77  The court noted that the Board had 
addressed the issue of Section 8(a)(1) in the context of the denial of 
representation at an employer-instigated interview,78 stating “[b]y necessary 
implication, Section 7 rights have been at issue in each of these cases.”79  
Nowhere in the litany of cases did the Board find that Section 7 mandates 
union representation in investigatory interviews where the employee fears his 
job might be in jeopardy. 
Moreover, the circuit court found no legal support for the Board’s 
conclusions.80  The court pointed out that the Board’s purpose is to determine 
whether the Act has been violated.81  Since the Board had never held this to be 
a violation in the past, the court saw no reason to hold it as one in this case.82 
2. N.L.R.B. v. Weingarten 
Weingarten came before the Board while the Fourth Circuit was 
considering Quality Manufacturing.83  In Weingarten, an employee suspected 
of theft was interrogated by her supervisor and store security.84  Several times 
during the interview the employee requested, and was subseqently denied, 
union representation.85 
The trial examiner relied on the Board’s decisions in Mobil Oil and Quality 
Manufacturing to hold that Section 8(a)(1) of the Act had been violated.86 In so 
determining, the trial examiner found the only real question that required 
 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 199.  As there can be no reasonable basis for the fear of adverse impact, the Board 
clarified that such protections are not intended to extend to “run-of-the-mill shop floor 
conversation.”  Id. 
 76. 481 F.2d 1018 (4th Cir. 1973). 
 77. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 78. Id. at 1024.  See also Ross Gear, 63 N.L.R.B. 1012 (1945); Dobbs House, 145 N.L.R.B. 
1565 (1964); Texaco, Inc., Houston Producing Div., 168 N.L.R.B. 361 (1967). 
 79. Quality Mfg., 195 N.L.R.B. at 1024. 
 80. In providing no statutory analysis the Board simply concluded, “[t]his seems to us to be 
the proper rule where, as here, the interview, whether or not purely investigative, concerns a 
subject matter related to disciplinary offenses.”  Id. at 1025. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. 202 N.L.R.B. 446 (1973). 
 84. Id. at 448.  The facts of Weingarten differed from Quality Manufacturing in that the 
employer did not discharge the employee.  See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 85. Weingarten, 202 N.L.R.B. at 448. 
 86. Id. at 449. 
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answering was whether the employee had a reasonable belief that her job was 
in danger.87  Under the standard set forth in Quality Manufacturing, the trial 
examiner found the test easily met.88 
The Fifth Circuit denied enforcement of the Board’s order.89  Relying on 
Board precedent and the decisions by the Fourth and Seventh Circuits in Mobil 
Oil90 and Quality Manufacturing,91 the court fell back on the 
investigatory/disciplinary differentiation and held the interview in Weingarten 
to be merely investigatory;92 as such, no right to union representation 
attached.93  Finally, the court flatly denied the Board’s attempt to distinguish 
this case because none of the previous cases had dealt with an alleged violation 
of Section 8(a)(1) in the context of union representation in employer-employee 
interviews.94 The court noted the Fourth Circuit decision in Quality 
Manufacturing which considered and rejected this contention.95 
C. The Supreme Court’s Weingarten Decision 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari for Weingarten in 1974.96  It was in 
this watershed case that the Supreme Court, in affirming the Board’s decision, 
delineated what has come to be known as “Weingarten rights.”  In its decision, 
the Court began by summarizing the Board’s holdings in Quality 
 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. N.L.R.B. v. Weingarten, 485 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1973). 
 90. See supra note 63. 
 91. See supra note 76. 
 92. Weingarten, 485 F.2d at 1137.  Concurring with its decision in Texaco Houston 
Producing Division v. N.L.R.B., the court stated that since there was no evidence that the 
employer sought to deal with the employee concerning her conditions of employment there was 
no need for, or right to, union representation.  Id. 
 93. Id. at 1138.  Once the interview was deemed investigatory, the precedent is 
overwhelming that there is no right to union representation at the interview.  Id. at 1137. 
 94. Id. at 1137.  The court concluded by stating that without some showing that the purpose 
of the interview was not merely to gather information but to impose discipline action, no union 
representation should be afforded.  Id. at 1138. 
 95. Id. at 1137. 
Every situation wherein an employee is directed by management to cooperate in an 
investigatory interview carries the implicit threat of discipline if such direction is not 
obeyed.  And the statement that a particular Section 7 right [the right to act in concert for 
mutual aid and protection] . . . had not been previously considered is inaccurate . . . .  
[T]he Board has many times been confronted with an alleged violation of Section 8(a)(1) 
in the context of a denial of union representation at employer-employee interviews.  By 
necessary implication, Section 7 rights have been at issue in each of these cases. 
Id. 
 96. 420 U.S. 251 (1975).  The Court also granted certiorari in Quality Manufacturing, 420 
U.S. 276 (1975).  The Court decided Weingarten and Quality Manufacturing jointly.  The Quality 
Mfg. Court held that its decision in Weingarten mandated a reversal of the Fourth Circuit’s 
finding that no violation had occurred.  Quality Mfg., 420 U.S. at 281. 
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Manufacturing and Mobil Oil which set forth the limits of an employee’s 
Section 7 rights.97 
First, the Board in Mobil Oil found that an employee has a Section 7 right 
to act in concert for mutual aid and protection.98  Second, an employee must 
request representation if they so desire it.99  Third, an employee’s Section 7 
right to representation at investigatory meetings applies only when the 
employee reasonably believes the investigation will likely result in disciplinary 
action.100  Fourth, the exercise of an employee’s rights may not interfere with 
“legitimate employer prerogatives.”101  Finally, the employer is under no 
obligation to bargain with the employee’s union representative during the 
investigatory meeting.102 
The Court stated that the Board’s holding in Weingarten was a permissible 
construction of the Act that should have been upheld by the Fifth Circuit.103  It 
noted that the goal of the NLRA is to protect a worker’s right to organize and 
designate representatives for the purpose of mutual aid and protection.104  The 
Board’s finding reinforced this goal by attempting to create a more level 
playing field between the employer and employees.  In doing so, the Court 
 
 97. Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 256. 
 98. Id.  “The denial of this right has a reasonable tendency to interfere with, restrain, and 
coerce employees in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.  Thus, it is a serious violation of the 
employee’s individual right to engage in concerted activity by seeking the assistance of his 
statutory representative if the employer denies the employee’s request and compels the employee 
to appear unassisted at an interview which may put his job security in jeopardy.”  Id. at 257. 
 99. Id. at 257.  As such, the employee has the right to forego union representation and 
continue with the interview unassisted.  See also Appalachian Power Co., 253 N.L.R.B. 931 
(1980) (holding that the employee, not the union, must request union representation in order for 
Weingarten right to be affective); Kenneth L. Judd, The Weingarten Right In A Nonunion Setting: 
A Permissible And Desirable Construction Of The National Labor Relations Act, 19 MEM. ST. L. 
REV. 207, 211-12 (1989). 
 100. Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 257.  The standard used to determine an employee’s ‘reasonable 
belief’ is an objective standard that takes into consideration all the facts of the case.  This 
standard was set out in the Board’s decision in Quality Manufacturing, 195 N.L.R.B. 197, 198 
n.3.  See also Judd, supra note 99, at 212. 
 101. Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 257.  The Court noted that the employer is not required to 
justify his refusal to allow union representation at an investigatory meeting.  Further, the Court 
noted that the employer may continue with his investigation without the interview taking place.  
Id. at 259.  This places the employee in the precarious position of choosing between foregoing the 
interview and the possible benefits thereof and submitting to the interview without representation.  
Id. 
 102. Id. at 259.  The representative is there to offer assistance in clearing up disputed or 
missing facts and to offer alternatives suggestions for finding needed information.  Id. at 260. 
 103. Id. at 261.  The Court further stated that such a finding was not required by the Act, but 
that it was clearly an acceptable interpretation.  Id. at 266. 
 104. Id. at 261-62.  See also Beth Ann Sabbath, The Right To Representation At Investigatory 
Interviews After Weingarten, 7 J. CORP. L. 851, 856 (1989). 
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found that to require an employee to confront his employer single-handedly 
would “perpetuate the inequity the Act was designed to eliminate.”105 
The presence of an employee’s union representative serves to protect not 
only the individual employee, but also the interests of the entire bargaining 
unit.  Therefore, it benefits the bargaining unit as a whole to ensure that the 
employer administers punishment in a just and fair manner.106  The Court 
rejected the contention that representation prior to the filing of a formal 
grievance is premature.107  Allowing representation only after discipline has 
been imposed makes it difficult for the employee to defend himself because at 
this stage of the process the employer is likely more concerned with justifying 
its actions rather than listening to the employee’s justification.108  Indeed, the 
Court recognized that a knowledgeable union representative could assist in the 
investigatory process by eliciting pertinent facts thus allowing the employer to 
“get to the bottom of the incident occasioning the interview.”109 
The Court accepted the Board’s argument that although some if its 
previous findings may have been contrary to its holding in Weingarten, those 
previous findings should not forestall the Board from making decisions in 
 
 105. Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 262. 
 106. Id. at 260. 
 107. Id. at 263. 
 108. Id. at 264.  The Court quoted from its opinion in Independent Lock Co.: “[Participation 
by the union representative] might reasonably be designed to clarify the issues at this first stage of 
the existence of a question, to bring out the facts and the policies concerned at this stage, to give 
assistance to employees who may lack the ability to express themselves in their cases, and who, 
when their livelihood is at stake, might in fact need the more experienced kind of counsel which 
their union steward might represent.  The foreman, himself, may benefit from the presence of the 
steward by seeing the issue, the problem, the implications of the facts, and the collective 
bargaining clause in question more clearly.  Indeed, good faith discussion at this level may solve 
many problems, and prevent needless hard feelings from arising . . . .”  Id. (quoting Independent 
Lock Co., 30 Lab. Arb. 744, 746 (1958)). 
 109. Id.  While a union representative is permitted to take part in investigatory meetings with 
the employer, there are several information-gathering incidents that do not always give rise to 
Weingarten rights.  See e.g., U.S. Postal Service, 252 N.L.R.B. 61 (1980) (stating that a company 
mandated medical examination for an employee returning on recall after being off work more 
than three months does not constitute “investigatory” for the purposes of Weingarten rights); E.I. 
du Pont de Nemours & Co., 100 L.R.R.M. 1633 (Advice Memorandum 1981) (holding that a 
search of an employee’s car, by itself, does not constitute an investigatory interview for purposes 
of Weingarten rights); Walnut Hill Convalescent Home, 114 L.R.R.M. 1255 (Advice 
Memorandum 1983) (finding that a handbag search, alone, does not rise to the level of an 
investigatory interview for purposes of imposing Weingarten rights); TCC Ctr. Companies, 275 
N.L.R.B. 604 (1985) (holding that an employee is only entitled to be represented by a union 
representative thus the employee was precluded from being represented by an attorney at an 
investigatory meeting).  But see Consol. Casinos Corp., 266 N.L.R.B. 988 (1983) (holding that an 
employee has the right to union representation during a polygraph test); Pacific Southwest 
Airlines, 242 N.L.R.B. 1169 (1979) (finding that Weingarten rights apply to telephone 
interviews). 
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accordance with current trends.110  The Court rejected the Fifth Circuit’s 
holding that the Board was bound by its own precedent, stating “to hold that 
the Board’s earlier decisions froze the development of this important aspect of 
the national labor law would misconceive the nature of administrative 
decisionmaking.”111 
The Court affirmed that it is the responsibility of the Board to respond to 
changes between labor and management and adapt the Act to meet those 
changes.112  As a result, any decision altering the field of labor-management 
relations should be afforded limited judicial review.  Finding that the circuit 
court overstepped its authority, the Court held that the Board’s determination 
that union representation at an employer-instigated interview was a plausible 
interpretation of the Act and it was within the Board’s power to so hold.113 
Justices Powell, Stewart, and Burger dissented in the Weingarten 
opinion.114  Chief Justice Burger took issue with the Board’s apparent lack of 
reasoning in overturning long-standing precedent,115 stating “[t]he tortured 
history and inconsistency of the Board’s efforts in this difficult area suggest 
the need for an explanation by the Board of why the new rule was adopted.”116  
The Chief Justice explained that for an administrative agency to maintain its 
integrity it must “disclose the basis of its order” and “give clear indications that 
it has exercised the discretion with which Congress has empowered it.”117 
 
 110. Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 265. 
 111. Id. at 265-66.  “[T]he nature of the problem, as revealed by unfolding variant situations, 
inevitably involves an evolutionary process for its rational response, not a quick, definitive 
formula as a comprehensive answer.  And so, it is not surprising that the Board has more or less 
felt its way . . . and has modified and reformed its standards on the basis of accumulating 
experience.”  Id. (quoting Electrical Workers v. N.L.R.B., 366 U.S. 667 (1961)).  See also 
Sabbath, supra note 104, at 855-56. 
 112. Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 266.  The Board has the “special function of applying the 
general provisions of the Act to the complexities of industrial life.”  Id. (quoting Republic 
Aviation, 324 U.S. 793, 798 (1945)). 
 113. Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 266.  The Court did not address nonunion employees’ right to 
assistance in investigatory meetings.  See Steve Carlin, Extending Weingarten Rights to Nonunion 
Employees, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 618, 620 (1986) (noting that the Court’s silence is not surprising 
since the Court stated that the Weingarten right should be examined through an “evolutionary 
process,” responding to differing scenarios as they arise) (emphasis added). 
 114. Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 269.  Justice Burger’s dissent is filed separately.  See N.L.R.B. 
v. Weingarten, 420 U.S. 268 (1975). 
 115. Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 269. 
 116. Id.  See also Gregory, supra note 46, at 593. 
 117. Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 269 (quoting Phelps Dodge Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 313 U.S. 177, 
197 (1941), and N.L.R.B. v. Metro. Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 438, 443 (1965)).  While conceding that 
there may be very good reasons for overturning thirty years of precedent, Chief Justice Burger 
would have remanded the case back to the Fourth Circuit with a directive to “enlighten us as to 
the reasons for this marked change in policy.”  Id. 
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Justices Powell and Stewart saw the majority’s decision as an 
encroachment on the bargaining process.118  “Congress’ goal in enacting 
federal labor legislation was to create a framework within which labor and 
management can establish the mutual rights and obligations that govern the 
employment relationship.  It was not this type of activity exercised by 
individual employees that Congress sought to protect.”119 
The right to discipline and discharge employees is a management right 
barring specific statutory limitations or limitations set forth in a collective 
bargaining agreement.120  As such, Justices Powell and Stewart found that 
union representation at investigatory interviews should be a subject of 
collective bargaining, not a Board mandate imposed under the guise of a 
Section 7 right.121 
Weingarten and the rights it delineated have been subject to a wide range 
of interpretations.  As is clearly demonstrated in the case history, Weingarten 
left many questions unanswered, thus leading the Board to a myriad of 
different interpretations.122 
D. Post-Weingarten Interpretations 
Cases following Weingarten addressed several different scenarios where 
the Weingarten principles were to be applied.123  For the most part, the cases 
have addressed only those employees represented by a union.124  The subject of 
 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 272-73. 
 120. Id. at 273-74. 
 121. Id. at 275. 
 122. See Gregory, supra note 46, at 582.  See also infra notes 294-297. 
 123. See Jill D. Flack, Limiting the Weingarten Right in the Nonunion Setting: The 
Implications of Sears, Roebuck and Co., 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 1033, 1046 (1986).  In Certified 
Grocers, the Board found that Weingarten applies to both investigatory and disciplinary 
interviews.  227 N.L.R.B. 1211, 1213-14 (1977), enforcement denied, 587 F.2d 436 (9th Cir. 
1978).  The Board reversed part of its Certified Grocers decision in Baton Rouge Water Works 
Co., where it held that an employee does not have a Section 7 right to representation at a meeting 
strictly called to impose a predetermined discipline.  246 N.L.R.B. 995, 997 (1979).  In Texaco, 
the Board expanded on its decision in Baton Rouge to state that an employer’s offer to give an 
employee the chance to explain their actions after the employer has imposed discipline did not 
warrant Weingarten representation.  246 N.L.R.B. 1021, 1022 (1979). 
 124. See Flack, supra note 123, at 1047.  See, e.g., Gulf States Mfg. v. N.L.R.B., 704 F.2d 
1390 (5th Cir. 1983) (finding that the employer violated an employee’s Weingarten rights when it 
refused to allow union representation at a meeting held solely to impose discipline where a fact-
finding question was asked); N.L.R.B. v. Texaco, Inc., 659 F.2d 124 (9th Cir. 1981) (stating that 
an employer violated Weingarten by allowing union representation but not allowing the 
representative to speak during the meeting); Lennox Indus. v. N.L.R.B., 637 F.2d 340 (5th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 452 U.S. 963 (1981) (finding a Weingarten violation where an employee was denied 
representation when the person conducting the meeting had no knowledge of the employee’s 
request, but the supervisor to whom the employee made the request was present at the meeting); 
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representation in a nonunion setting was addressed only indirectly, with most 
circuits finding that representation was appropriate.125 
For instance, in ITT Lighting Fixtures v. NLRB,126 the Sixth Circuit found 
that an employer’s denial of an employee’s request that a coworker be present 
during an investigatory meeting violated Weingarten despite the fact that the 
would-be representative could not have been a union representative due to the 
fact that the union had not yet been certified.127  Likewise, in Anchortank v. 
N.L.R.B., the Fifth Circuit held that an employee is entitled to Weingarten 
representation regardless of the employer’s challenge of a recent certification 
election.128 
1. Materials Research Corp. 
In 1982, the Board first extended Weingarten rights in a nonunion setting 
in Materials Research Corp.129  The ALJ found that the company had not 
violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act when it conducted an investigatory meeting 
without allowing an employee representative to be present as requested by the 
disciplined employee.130  The ALJ’s determination was premised on the fact 
that the employees were not represented by a union.131  As such, the 
Weingarten doctrine was not applicable.132 
 
Good Hope Refineries, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 620 F.2d 57 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1012 
(1980) (holding that an employer violated the Act by denying an employee union representation 
at a meeting to discuss an absenteeism issue). 
 125. Id.  See e.g., Crown Cork & Seal Co., 255 N.L.R. B. 14, 48-49 (1981), enforced without 
opinion, 691 F.2d 506 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that despite the employer’s refusal to recognize 
the union, an employee is still entitled to representation at investigatory meetings). 
 126. 719 F.2d 851 (6th Cir. 1983). 
 127. Id. at 854. 
 128. 618 F.2d 1153, 1165 (5th Cir. 1980). 
 129. 262 N.L.R.B. 1010 (1982).  Employees in the precious metal department (“PDM”) of the 
Materials Research Corp. were told by their supervisor that effective the following day they 
would all be placed on new work schedules.  Annoyed with the sudden change, one employee, 
Hochman, attempted to arrange a meeting with management and a group of employees to express 
their displeasure with the new schedule but was refused.  After several attempts, Hochman was 
told to come to his supervisor’s office.  Hochman informed his supervisor that under federal law 
he was entitled to have another employee present at any meeting that may lead to disciplinary 
action.  The supervisor responded that there was no such right and ordered Hochman to sit down 
for the interview.  At that time, Hochman was given a written reprimand for organizing the group 
meeting.  Hochman subsequently filed an unfair labor practice charge alleging that Materials 
Research had violated his rights by refusing to allow a coworker to be present during the meeting.  
Id. at 1010-11. 
 130. Id. at 1025-27. 
 131. Id. at 1027. 
 132. Id. 
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The Board’s conclusion “that the right enunciated in Weingarten applies 
equally to represented and unrepresented employees”133 was based on the 
Board’s opinion that the right to representation at investigatory meetings stems 
not from Section 9 of the Act134 but from Section 7 rights which are not 
dependent upon union organization.135  The Board reasoned that had the Court 
intended to extend Weingarten rights to union represented employees only, the 
Court’s decision would have been based on Section 9 of the Act.136  The 
Materials Research Board ignored the fact that the Supreme Court had 
specifically held that union employees were entitled to representation at 
investigatory interviews.137  The use of the term “union representative” in the 
Court’s Weingarten decision, the Materials Research Board reasoned, was 
merely a result of the fact pattern presented in that case.138 
The Materials Research Board further stated that the Court’s underlying 
purpose in developing Weingarten rights was to put the employer and 
employee on more equal footing.139  Even if the nonunion individual present at 
the meeting does nothing more than act as a witness, the mere presence of a 
coworker at the meeting advances that purpose of the Act.140  Indeed, the 
Board reasoned that representation at an investigatory meeting may be more 
important in the nonunion setting because those employees do not have access 
to a grievance-arbitration procedure as do union represented employees.141 
 
 133. Id. at 1016. 
 134. The relevant portion of Section 9 states:  “Representatives designated or selected for the 
purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such 
purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit.”  29 U.S.C. § 
159(a) (1994). 
 135. Materials Research, 262 N.L.R.B. at 1012.  The Board did recognize that in limited 
instances, Section 7 rights have been curtailed based on an employee’s membership in a labor 
organization.  See Emporium Capwell, 420 U.S. 50 (1975) (holding that union represented 
employee’s attempt to deal with their employer directly thus circumventing the union was not 
protected activity under the Act); N.L.R.B. v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 50 (1975) 
(finding that the protections of Section 7 should extend to nonunion employees who walked off 
the job due to substandard working conditions). 
 136. Materials Research, 262 N.L.R.B. at 1012 n.9.  Section 9(a) gives the union the 
exclusive right to bargain on behalf of its member.  Thus, the Board stated that were Weingarten 
rights a function solely of a union’s status as a collective-bargaining representative the rights 
could be invoked by the union, regardless of the wishes of the employee.  Such is not the case as 
Weingarten rights may only be invoked by the employee facing the investigatory interview.  
NLRB v. Weingarten, 420 U.S. 251, 257 (1975). 
 137. Materials Research, 262 N.L.R.B. at 1012. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 1015.  See also Judd, supra note 99, at 215. 
 140. Materials Research, 262 N.L.R.B. at 1012. 
 141. Id. 
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To further support its position, the Board turned to its decision in Glomac 
Plastics, Inc.,142 where it held, “Section 7 rights are enjoyed by all employees 
and are in no way dependent on union representation for implementation.”143  
The Board in Glomac found its position bolstered by Justices Powell and 
Stewart’s dissenting opinion in Weingarten: “While the Court speaks only of 
the right to insist on the presence of a union representative, it must be assumed 
that the Section 7 right today recognized affording employees the right to act 
‘in concert’ in employer interviews, also exists in the absence of a recognized 
union.”144 
Chairman Van De Water dissented in the Materials Research decision.145  
In his view, Weingarten applied in only unionized settings where the employer 
was obligated to deal with union representatives.146  In the absence of a union, 
the employer is under no duty to deal with its employees over terms and 
conditions of employment.147  Once the employees have elected a bargaining 
representative, the employer is no longer permitted to deal with its employees 
on an individual basis.148  Relying on the Board’s pre-Weingarten decision in 
Texaco, Houston Producing Division,149 Van De Water noted the Texaco 
Board’s determination that a collective bargaining relationship was an essential 
element in the determination of an employee’s right to representation at 
investigatory meetings.150 
Although purporting to extend Weingarten rights to nonunion employees, 
the Materials Research decision was nonetheless subject to varying 
interpretations.  In E.I. du Pont de Nemours (Du Pont I),151 the Board found 
that E.I. du Pont, a nonunion company, had violated the Act by refusing to 
allow a nonunion employee to have a witness present at a disciplinary 
meeting.152  The Ninth Circuit thereafter refused enforcement of the Board’s 
 
 142. 234 N.L.R.B. 1309 (1978). 
 143. Id. at 1310. 
 144. Id. at 1311 (citing Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 270). 
 145. Materials Research, 262 N.L.R.B. at 1016. 
 146. John R. Van De Water, New Trends In N.L.R.B. Law, 33 LAB. L. J. 635 (1982).  “In my 
view, an employer cannot be compelled (absent certification or recognition) to recognize any 
individual or group as a representative of its employees . . . .  While the Board majority may feel 
that nonunion employees need representatives, they ought not disrupt the statutory scheme to 
achieve their view of equality.”  Id. at 640. 
 147. Materials Research, 262 N.L.R.B. at 1016. 
 148. Id. at 1016-17. 
 149. See supra note 27. 
 150. Materials Research, 262 N.L.R.B. at 1017. 
 151. 262 N.L.R.B. 1040 (1982). 
 152. Id. at 1045 (1982).  In this case, the employer docked an employee’s pay in response to 
the employee’s unauthorized visit to his doctor.  The following day the employer presented the 
employee with a list of his work deficiencies and a document containing the conditions necessary 
for his continued employment.  The employee refused to sign the forms unless a coworker was 
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order.153 The court stated that the Du Pont I case lacked any showing that the 
employee in question was acting on behalf of other employees and was 
therefore not acting in “concert for mutual aid and protection.”154  While 
noting that unionization is not the only indicator of concertedness, the court 
stated that there must be a showing that the requesting employee acts as part of 
a group.155 
2. Sears Roebuck and DuPont II 
Materials Research remained controlling for only three years.  A change in 
Board membership156 brought about the reversal of Materials Research with 
the Board’s decision in Sears Roebuck.157  The Sears Board found erroneous 
the Materials Research Board’s determination that Weingarten was decided 
based solely on Section 7.158  The Board looked to its decision in Emporium 
Capwell for guidance.159 
In Emporium Capwell, the Supreme Court upheld the Board’s finding that 
seven union-represented employees were legitimately discharged for picketing 
their employer.160  Despite the fact that the employees were clearly engaged in 
concerted activity, the Court found the employee’s conduct circumvented the 
union in their efforts to deal directly with the company, which contravened the 
exclusivity provisions of Section 9.161  Although the employees were engaged 
in concerted activity that would have been protected by Section 7, even in the 
absence of a union, the exercise of those rights could not act to displace “the 
orderly collective-bargaining process contemplated by the NLRA.”162  As 
such, the Sears Board reasoned that Section 7 rights can vary depending on an 
 
present to act as a witness.  The employer denied the employee’s request and subsequently 
discharged him.  Id. 
 153. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours and Co. v. N.L.R.B., 707 F.2d 1076, 1078 (9th Cir. 1983). 
 154. Id. at 1078.  The Weingarten Court’s assumption of concertedness is supported by the 
fact that a bargaining unit had been organized through concerted activity.  As such, an employee’s 
request for representation would be an extension of that concerted activity.  Id. 
 155. Id. at 1079.  See also Meyers Indus., Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 493, 497 (1984) (holding that for 
an activity to be ‘concerted’ it must be engaged in with or on the authority of other employees, 
not for one individual). 
 156. See Judd, supra note 99, at 216 n.52.  The five members of the N.L.R.B. are appointed 
by the President for staggered terms of five years.  As a result, the make-up of the Board changes 
on a yearly basis, often resulting in conflicting conclusions, as was the case here.  See infra note 
249 for further discussion regarding the appointment of Board members. 
 157. 274 N.L.R.B. 230 (1985).  
 158. Id. at 231. 
 159. Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Cmty. Org., 420 U.S. 50 (1975). 
 160. Id. at 70. 
 161. Id. at 71-72.  “Even assuming that [Title VII] protects employees’ picketing and 
instituting a consumer boycott of their employer, the same conduct is not necessarily entitled to 
affirmative protection from the NLRA.”  Id.  See also Flack, supra note 123, at 1052. 
 162. Emporium Capwell, 420 U.S. at 69. 
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employee’s union status: “Section 7 rights of one group [of non-represented 
employees] cannot be mechanically transplanted to the other group [of 
represented employees] at the expense of important statutory policies.”163 
The Sears Board also found fault with the Materials Research Board’s 
argument that because a Weingarten representative has no authority to bargain 
with the employer during an interview, the Weingarten principles easily extend 
to nonunion employers.164  While such representatives have no authority to 
bargain with the employer during the interview, the representative still 
maintains the right to be heard at the meeting and make suggestions.165 
Moreover, the Supreme Court’s decision in Weingarten found that a union 
representative represents not only the employee being interviewed, but also all 
other employees in the unit.166  Such a notion, the Sears Board ruled, does not 
exist in nonunion settings and to hold otherwise would give nonunion 
employees the benefit of union representation without the burden of certifying 
a union.  This, the Board stated, contravenes the Act’s exclusivity provision.167 
Not long after the Sears decision, the Board’s decision in E.I. du Pont de 
Nemours v. N.L.R.B. (Du Pont II) came before the Third Circuit.168  In Du Pont 
II, an employee was discharged from a nonunion workplace for refusing to 
attend an employer interview without a coworker present.  After a lengthy 
review process,169 the Board held that a nonunion employee does not have a 
Section 7 right to the presence of a coworker in an investigatory interview.170 
 
 163. Sears, 274 N.L.R.B. at 231. 
 164. Id. at 231-32. 
 165. See Southwestern Bell, 251 N.L.R.B. 612 (1980).  The Board affirmed an ALJ’s 
determination that the Company had violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act when it required the 
union steward to remain silent during an investigatory interview.  Id. at 620.  See also supra note 
31. 
 166. NLRB v. Weingarten, 420 U.S. 251, 260 (1975).  Member Van De Water, in his 
dissenting opinion in Materials Research, pointed out that a representative’s ability to speak and 
offer alternative discipline constitutes “dealing with” the employer.  Such dealings, Van De Water 
suggested, are tantamount to a labor union’s status as the elected representative of the employees.  
Materials Research, 262 N.L.R.B. at 1016 n.30, 1019 n.40. 
 167. Sears, 274 N.L.R.B. at 232.  Section 9 of the Act states that “[r]epresentatives designated 
or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit 
appropriate for such purposes shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such 
unit.”  29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1994). 
 168. 724 F.2d 1061 (3rd Cir. 1983). 
 169. E.I. Du Pont (also known as Slaughter) was first decided in 1982.  E.I. Du Pont de 
Nemours and Slaughter, 262 N.L.R.B. 1028 (1982).  In that case, the Board affirmed the ALJ’s 
determination that Du Pont had violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by discharging an employee 
for refusing to submit to a management investigatory interview without the presence of another 
employee as a witness.  Id. at 1029.  Du Pont filed a petition with the Third Circuit for review of 
the Board’s decision, and the Board filed a cross-application for enforcement of its Decision and 
Order.  The Third Circuit panel enforced the Board’s Order.  Du Pont II, 724 F.2d at 1063.  Du 
Pont filed a motion for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc.  Two weeks after Du Pont’s 
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The Du Pont II Board reiterated the Supreme Court’s observation that the 
question of whether an employee is entitled to representation at 
employer/employee meetings in which discipline is the likely result involves 
the “difficult task of ‘reconciling conflicting interests of labor and 
management.’”171  In concluding that the Weingarten rights should not be 
extended to unrepresented employees, the Du Pont II Board stated that the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Weingarten did not comport to a nonunion 
setting.172 The Board noted that Weingarten relied on the fact that 
representation would safeguard not only the accused employee, but the entire 
bargaining unit as well.173  In this regard, the Du Pont II Board found that a 
coworker representative would have little, if any, of the same interests as a 
union representative and would possess no duty to represent all similarly 
situated employees.174 
 
motion, the Board requested that the circuit court vacate its decision and remand the case back to 
the Board for consideration.  The Third Circuit granted the rehearing, vacated its previous opinion 
and remanded the case back to the Board.  E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. (Chestnut Run) v. 
N.L.R.B., 733 F.2d 296, 298 (3rd Cir. 1984). 
  After reviewing the record, as well as position statements filed by both parties, the Board 
issued a supplemental Decision and Order reversing the ALJ’s findings and held that the 
Company did not violate the Act when it terminated an employee for refusing to meet without 
another employee present.  E.I. Du Pont de Nemours and Slaughter, 274 N.L.R.B. 1104 (1985).  
In so finding, the Board relied on its decision in Sears Roebuck which had been decided by the 
time Du Pont II came to the Board.  Sears, 274 N.L.R.B. 230 (1985).  Specifically, the Du Pont 
Board relied on the Sears Board’s determination that the Act compelled a finding that nonunion 
employees are not entitled to union representation at investigatory interviews.  Du Pont, 274 
N.L.R.B. at 1104.  The charging party filed a petition with the Third Circuit for review of the 
Board’s supplemental Order.  The court again remanded the case back to the Board, stating that 
the Board’s reliance on the Sears mandate was erroneous.  Specifically, the Board was wrong in 
finding that the Act compels a finding that nonunion employees have no right to coworker 
presence at disciplinary meetings.  Slaughter v. N.L.R.B., 794 F.2d 120 (3rd Cir. 1986).  The 
Board was directed to consider whether the Act precluded an alternative interpretation, for 
instance, that nonrepresented employees are entitled to the assistance of a coworker at 
investigatory meetings.  Id. at 128. 
  On its third review, the Board held that the Act does not proscribe an interpretation that 
nonunion employees are entitled to a coworker’s presence at employer/employee meetings where 
discipline is at issue.  E.I. Du Pont de Nemours and Slaughter, 289 N.L.R.B. 627, 628 n.8 (1988). 
 170. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours, 289 N.L.R.B. at 630-31. 
 171. Id. at 628 (quoting Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 267). 
 172. Id. at 629. 
 173. Id. at 628 (citing Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 261). 
 174. Id. at 629.  The Board also noted that the coworker representative in a nonunion setting 
would be less likely, if not completely unable, to vigorously represent an employee in the same 
fashion as a union representative.  Id.  The union representative will usually have the benefit of an 
established framework, namely a grievance and arbitration procedure, in which to work.  Id.  The 
unrepresented coworker representative could act as nothing more than a witness and would have 
little power to redress any concerns of the employees.  Id. at 629-30. 
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The Du Pont II Board recognized that in Weingarten the Supreme Court 
held that union representatives at disciplinary interviews could also be a 
benefit to the employer.  It was the Court’s position that having a union 
representative present would likely help the employer get to the root of the 
problem more efficiently.175  Moreover, the union representative, while unable 
to negotiate with the employer on behalf of the employee, can offer 
suggestions or alternative disciplinary measures.176  Finding these factors 
lacking in a nonunion shop, the Du Pont II Board refused to extend 
Weingarten beyond a union setting.177 
The Board also held that the employer’s ability to forego an interview 
when an employee requests a representative’s presence weighed heavily in 
favor of not extending Weingarten to a nonunion setting.178  Unlike a union 
environment where the employer’s conduct could eventually be challenged 
through the grievance procedure, a nonunion employee may likely lose his 
only chance to tell his side of the story if the employer opts to forego the 
interview.179 
Du Pont II upheld the Sears Board’s determination that the interests of 
labor and management were not served by the extension of Weingarten to 
nonunion employees.  In so holding, however, the Du Pont II Board 
specifically rejected the Sears Board’s finding that its interpretation was the 
only one permissible under the Act.180  While acknowledging that the statute 
may be amenable to other interpretations, the Du Pont II Board refused to 
revert to the findings of Materials Research.181 
 
 175. Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 263. 
 176. Du Pont, 289 N.L.R.B. at 629-30. 
 177. Id. at 630.  “Examining the foregoing considerations in a non-union setting, we conclude 
that many of the useful objectives listed by the Court [in Weingarten] are much less likely to be 
achieved or are irrelevant.”  Specifically, the Board stated that a nonunion representative has no 
obligation to represent the interests of the entire workgroup.  Further, the Board noted that a 
nonunion advocate would be much less versed in his role as an employee representative, thus 
providing little benefit to either employee or employer.  Id. at 629-30.  See also Charles J. Morris, 
N.L.R.B. Protection in the Nonunion Workplace: A Glimpse at a General Theory of Section 7 
Conduct, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1673, 1735 (1989). 
 178. Du Pont, 289 N.L.R.B. at 630. 
 179. Id. at 630. 
 180. Id. at 628 n.8.  “In so concluding, we overrule the Board’s finding in Sears . . . that the 
Act compels a finding that unrepresented employees are not entitled to the presence of a fellow 
employee during an investigatory interview.”  Id. 
 181. See supra notes 129-144 and accompanying text. 
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III.  IN RE EPILEPSY FOUNDATION 
The Board’s recent ruling in In re Epilepsy Foundation tipped the scales in 
favor of employees once again.182  In overruling Sears and DuPont II, the 
Board reverted to its short-lived decision in Materials Research.183 
A. Epilepsy Foundation Facts 
Employees Borgs and Hasan were employed with the Epilepsy Foundation 
of Northeast Ohio in a school-to-work research program for teenagers with 
epilepsy.184  On January 17, 1996, Borgs and Hasan sent a memo to Rick 
Berger, their supervisor on the school-to-work project, stating that his 
assistance was no longer needed.185  A copy of the memo was given to the 
Foundation’s Executive Director, Christine Loehrke.186  On January 29, 1996, 
upon learning of Loehrke’s displeasure with their memo, Borgs and Hasan 
wrote another memo addressed to Loehrke, wherein they attempted to explain 
the contentions made in the initial correspondence.187  This memo criticized 
Berger’s contribution to the program and listed specific incidents where, in the 
opinions of Borgs and Hasan, Berger had acted inappropriately.188 
Two days later, Loehrke approached Borgs and instructed him to meet 
with her and Berger.189  Borgs told Loehrke that he was not comfortable 
meeting alone with Loehrke and Berger.190  Borgs asked if he could meet with 
just Loehrke; she declined.191  He then asked if Hasan could be present at the 
 
 182. In re Epilepsy Foundation, Nos. 8-CA-28169 and 8-CA-28264, 2000 WL 967066 
(N.L.R.B. Jul. 10, 2000). 
 183. See supra note 181 and accompanying text. 
 184. Epilepsy Foundation, 2000 WL 967066, at *1 
 185. Id.  The memo read: 
  Mr. Jim Troxell and Dr. Bob Fraser have continued to provide supervisory input 
pertaining to service delivery and the research component of the study.  During the past 
several months, Ms. Christine Loehrke has also provided input and assistance to the 
NIDRR School-to-Work Project. 
  As mentioned during earlier discussions (albeit brief) with you, both Dr. Ashraful 
Hasan and Mr. Arnis Borgs reiterate that your supervision of the program operations 
performed by them is not required. 
  Your input to the NIDRR project in the past is appreciated.  At this stage, the major 
area which has to be addressed deals with outreach.  Only support staff assistance is 
needed in this regard. 
Id. at *1 n.7. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Epilepsy Foundation, 2000 WL 967066, at *2. 
 190. Contributing also to his uneasiness was the fact that in 1995 Borgs had been interrogated 
and disciplined for discussing salary information with other employees.  Id. at *2 n.10. 
 191. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1332 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 45:1309 
meeting; Loehrke again declined.192  When Borgs continued to refuse to meet, 
he was discharged.193 
Loehrke later wrote in Borgs’ subsequent termination letter that his refusal 
to attend the meeting constituted gross insubordination.194 
B. The Discharge of Borgs195 
The ALJ found that under the holding in DuPont II, the employer was 
under no obligation to grant Borgs’ request that Hasan be present at the 
meeting with Loehrke,196 and as such, the ALJ found that the Company’s 
discharge of Borgs did not violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.197  Although the 
Board acknowledged that the ALJ’s determination was correctly construed 
from relevant Board precedent, the Board found the precedent to be 
inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s Weingarten decision, and with the 
underlying purposes of the Act.198 
The Board’s analysis started with an examination of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Weingarten.199 The Board specifically noted that the Court’s 
decision found that an employee’s actions in seeking representation in 
situations of employer investigatory interviews falls under the literal wording 
of Section 7.200  Thus, an employee in such a situation has the right to “engage 
in concerted activities for the purpose of . . . mutual aid or protection.”201 
Moreover, the Board noted the Court’s reasoning that representation at 
investigatory interviews helps safeguard all employees against unjust 
punishment.202  The Board found this notion, when coupled with the Court’s 
 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Epilepsy Foundation, 2000 WL 967066, at *2.  The letter also made reference to the 
January 17 memo, as well as to a “‘failure to build constructive work relationships with 
management personnel,’” and a “‘resistance to accept responsibility for attempting to attain 
articulated performance goals.’”  The letter did not refer to these other acts as examples of gross 
insubordination.  Id. at *2 n.6. 
 195. Hasan was terminated a few months after Borgs for an incident unrelated to Borgs’ 
termination.  This Note addresses only the discharge of Borgs and his request that Hasan be 
present during the meeting with his supervisors. 
 196. Epilepsy Foundation, 2000 WL 967066, at *2.  While noting that unionized employees 
enjoy the right to have a representative present at investigatory interviews, the Board noted that 
the ALJ held, “under current Board precedent, employees in nonunionized workplaces do not 
have the right to have a coworker present in similar circumstances.”  Id. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id.   “After careful consideration, however, we find that precedent to be inconsistent with 
the rationale articulated in the Supreme Court’s Weingarten decision, and with the purposes of 
the Act.”  Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Epilepsy Foundation, 2000 WL 967066, at *2. 
 201. Id.  See also supra note 6. 
 202. Epilepsy Foundation, 2000 WL 967066, at *3. 
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literal reading of the Act, illustrated that the right to representation is based on 
a finding that the Act affords all employees the ability to band together to 
address the imposition of unjust punishment.203 
In finding that an employee’s right to representation is settled in Section 7, 
the Board stated that the holdings in both Sears and DuPont II erroneously 
limited the applicability of Weingarten to union represented employees.204  In 
reverting to the Materials Research holding, the Board stated: “In our view, 
the Board was correct in Materials Research to attach much significance to the 
fact that the Court’s Weingarten decision found that the right was grounded in 
the language of Section 7 of the Act, specifically the right to engage in 
‘concerted activities for the purpose of mutual aid or protection.’”205  The 
Board found this reasoning is equally applicable in circumstances where there 
is no bargaining unit.  It rationalized that a coworker’s presence during an 
investigatory interview better equips the employees to act in concert to ensure 
that the employer does not impose discipline unjustly.206 
The Board in Epilepsy Foundation rejected the contention that their ruling 
would “wreak havoc” with the provisions of the Act that guarantee nonunion 
employers the right to deal individually with their employees.207  While it is 
true that an employer is generally free to deal with nonrepresented employees 
on an individual basis, the Board concluded that in doing so, an employer may 
not interfere with an employee’s efforts to exercise their Section 7 rights.208 
Dissenting Member Brame argued that extending Weingarten beyond the 
union shop would essentially force employer’s to “deal with” what is in 
essence a labor organization.  The Epilepsy Foundation Board disagreed and 
discounted the contention that allowing this would conflict with the exclusivity 
principles of Section 9 of the Act.209  Ultimately, the Board stated that this 
issue had been addressed by the Third Circuit in Slaughter v. N.L.R.B.210 
 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. at *4.  See also supra note 6. 
 206. Epilepsy Foundation, 2000 WL 967066, at *4.  The Board found its holding effectuates 
the policy that “Section 7 rights are enjoyed by all employees and are in no wise [sic] dependent 
on union representation for their implementation.”  Id. at *4 (quoting Glomac Plastics, Inc., 234 
N.L.R.B. 1309, 1311 (1978)). 
 207. Id at *4. 
 208. Id. (relying on Ontario Knife Co. v. N.L.R.B., 637 F.2d 840, 844-50 (2nd Cir. 1980) 
(holding that while an employer is generally free to deal with employees on an individual basis in 
the absence of a union, an employer may not interfere with the efforts of the employee to exercise 
his Section 7 rights by asserting a right to deal with him on an individual basis)). 
 209. Id.  See infra note 232 and accompanying text.  See also supra note 134. 
 210. Slaughter v. N.L.R.B., 794 F.2d 120 (3rd Cir. 1986).  In Du Pont II, the Board rejected 
the argument that ‘dealing with’ an employer is the equivalent of ‘bargaining with’ the employer.  
Id. at 127 (1986).  See supra note 169 for the DuPont II chronology. 
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The Board noted that in Slaughter the court found misplaced the concerns 
regarding the extension of Weingarten to nonunion settings being violative of 
Section 9 of the Act.211  The Slaughter Board held that although the employee 
had a right to the presence of a coworker at the interview, the employer had no 
duty to bargain with the employee representative.  In other words, the 
employer must “deal with” the employee representative but has no duty to 
“bargain with” the representative.  As such, the fact that an employer must 
merely “deal with” a representative cannot be a violation of Section 9, which 
addresses only the issue of representation for the purpose of collective 
bargaining.212 
The Board also soundly rejected the DuPont II Board’s assertion that a 
coworker in a nonunion setting has no obligation or incentive to represent the 
interests of fellow employees and will likely not have the necessary skills with 
which to adequately represent employees.213  The Board stated that such 
contentions were speculative at best and ignored the fact that an employee may 
opt to forego representation altogether when he or she believes that 
representation will not be helpful.214  Further, Section 7 rights do not turn on 
the abilities or on the motivations of the employee representatives and should 
therefore not preclude employees from exercising these rights.215 
Additionally, the Epilepsy Foundation Board found no merit in the Du 
Pont II conclusion that extending these rights to nonunion employees may 
cause these employees to lose their one and only opportunity to tell their side 
of the story in that the employers can opt to forego the interview completely.216  
Finding this scenario based “wholly on speculation,” the Board found no 
reason to assume that employers would act purposefully to the detriment of the 
employee.217  The Board again pointed out that the employee is not required to 
request coworker representation and may therefore weigh his or her options of 
doing so.218 
Finally, the Board found unpersuasive the dissent’s concerns that the 
Board’s ruling would place an “unknown trip wire” on employers who are 
justifiably investigating employee conduct ignorant of the holding in 
 
 211. Epilepsy Foundation, 2000 WL 967066, at *5 (citing Slaughter, 794 F.2d at 128). 
 212. Id. (quoting NLRB v. Weingarten, 420 U.S. 251, 259 (1975)). 
 213. Id. at 5.  See supra notes 177 and accompanying text. 
 214. Epilepsy Foundation, 2000 WL 967066, at *5. 
 215. Id.  The Board stated that the import of Section 7 lies not with the sophistication of the 
representation provided but with the fact that the employee was able to exercise his Section 7 
rights in requesting that representation.  Id. at *6 n.12. 
 216. Id. at *6.  See supra note 180 and accompanying text. 
 217. Epilepsy Foundation, 2000 WL 967066, at *6.  This begs the question that if the Board 
firmly believes that the employer would not purposefully act to the detriment of the employee 
then why would an employee need representation in an investigatory interview at all? 
 218. Id. 
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Weingarten.219  In addressing this concern, the Board again stated that such a 
contention is speculative and that regardless, an employer’s ignorance of an 
employee’s rights cannot be a justification for denying those rights to the 
employee.220 
C. Dissenting Opinions 
1. Member Hurtgen 
The dissenting opinions by Members Hurtgen and Brame took up where 
Van De Water’s dissent in Materials Research left off.221  Member Hurtgen 
stated that Section 7 of the Act protects an employee’s right to request 
representation at an investigatory interview, but the Act does not require the 
employer to grant the request.222  Phrasing the issue in Epilepsy Foundation as 
whether federal law forbids a nonunion employer from dealing individually 
with an employee during an interview with the employer, Member Hurtgen 
argued this question had been answered in the negative in DuPont II.223 
Relying on the Court’s rationale in Weingarten, that a union representative 
safeguards the interests of the entire unit, Hurtgen found as implausible the 
majority’s extension of this right to unrepresented employees:224  “[I]n a 
nonunion setting, there is no ‘union representative’, and there is no ‘bargaining 
unit.’  Thus, it is plain that the Court in Weingarten did not envisage rights to 
representation in a nonunion setting.”225 
 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id.  In reversing the trial examiner’s decision, the court went a step further and 
retroactively applied its holding in Epilepsy Foundation.  “We agree . . . that the Board should not 
reverse important legal doctrine absent compelling considerations for doing so . . . .  [W]e find 
that such compelling considerations are present here because . . . the doctrine infringes upon the 
exercise of Sec. 7 rights and is inconsistent both with Supreme Court precedent and the policies 
of the Act.”  Id. at *4 n.8.  Dissenting Member Hurtgen disagreed characterizing the Board’s 
imposition of retribution on an employer who acted in accordance with the rules in place at the 
time “manifestly unjust.” 
 221. Id. at *12.  See also supra notes 145-150 and accompanying text. 
 222. Epilepsy Foundation, 2000 WL 967066, at *12. 
 223. Id.  See supra notes 168-180. 
 224. Epilepsy Foundation, 2000 WL 967066, at *13.  The majority refuted Hurtgen’s 
contention that the Court’s opinion in Weingarten speaks for itself in that it refers specifically to 
“the union representative whose participation [the employee] seeks” in safeguarding the interests 
of the “bargaining unit.”  The majority held that the Court’s wording was representative of the 
facts before the Court in Weingarten and should not be read to mean that Weingarten rights 
extend only to unionized employees.  Id. at *4 n.9. 
 225. Id.  The difference between represented and unrepresented employees is unambiguous.  
Unrepresented employees may be dealt with individually with regards to terms of employment 
while employees represented by a union may not.  The majority’s decision, Hurtgen argued, 
eliminated this bright line.  Id. 
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Hurtgen found that the employer has the unequivocal right to weigh the 
benefit of having a coworker present at an investigatory interview.226  If an 
employer decides that the coworker’s presence will not help the interview 
process, he is not legally obligated to grant the request.227  Likewise, an 
employer has the unfettered right to dispense with the interview entirely.  If 
that determination is made, Hurtgen argued the government has no business 
contradicting that decision.228  By doing so in Epilepsy Foundation, the Board 
set forth an obstacle whereby “employers who are legitimately pursuing 
investigations of employee conduct will face an unknown trip-wire . . . .”229  
Further, because this evolution of the law will likely be unknown to most 
nonunion employers, the resulting violations will likely result in a wealth of 
litigation.230 
2. Member Brame 
In the same vein, Member Brame argued that the majority’s interpretation 
of the Act will alter the well-established relationship between management and 
labor, a relationship that is grounded in the Board’s case history.231  He argued 
that the majority’s interpretation extended representation rights to nonunion 
employees who were not due such rights since no bargaining unit had been 
elected by the employees.232  Such an interpretation of the Act is, in Brame’s 
view, incorrect because the scope of Section 7 rights depends on the 
employee’s union status.233 
Reiterating Member Hurtgen’s dissenting opinion, Brame stated that 
nonunion employees have the right to request, but not insist upon, 
representation.234  Brame, however, went further to question the majority’s 
rationale for allowing representation in this sole situation when no right of 
 
 226. Id. at *14. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Epilepsy Foundation, 2000 WL 967066, at *14. 
 230. Id.  Hurtgen prolifically stated, “The workplace has become a garden of litigation and the 
Board is adding another cause of action to flower therein, but hiding in the weeds.”  Id.  See also 
Susan J. McGolrick, Employee Rights: Attorneys Disagree About Wisdom of N.L.R.B. Extending 
Weingarten, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 152, at C-1 (Aug. 7, 2000) (stating that the extension of 
these rights to nonunion employees is more of a concern for smaller employers who do have 
regular legal counsel and could be “tripped up” not knowing they are violating the statute). 
 231. Epilepsy Foundation, 2000 WL 967066, at *16.  Brame, in a customarily lengthy 
dissent, offers an extensive recitation of Board precedent on the issue of extending Weingarten 
rights to nonunion employees.  Id. at *16-19. 
 232. Id. at *16. 
 233. Id.  See also supra notes 159-163. 
 234. Epilepsy Foundation, 2000 WL 967066, at *28. 
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representation attaches to meetings held to discuss other terms and conditions 
of employment.235 
The majority responded to this concern by stating that in Weingarten, the 
Court addressed only the specific right of representation in investigatory 
interviews.236  As such, other employment situations were not “encompassed 
within the Weingarten rationale” and not before the Board.237  Brame asserted 
that the majority avoided this issue because there is no rational reason to 
extend Weingarten rights to nonunion employees for one type of meeting and 
not another.238 
Assuming, arguendo, that the majority’s interpretation was found to be a 
permissible one, Brame posited that its holding is not the best alternative.239  
Like Member Hurtgen, Member Brame placed significant reliance on the 
effectiveness of coworker representation in the absence of a certified union.240  
While a union representative can assist both the employer and the employee at 
an investigatory interview, a coworker representative will not likely provide 
much assistance.241  Brame attributes this to the fact that union representatives 
are usually accustomed to attending fact-finding meetings and may, in some 
cases, have formal training in advocacy, whereas a coworker representative 
will likely have no experience at all.242 
The majority discounted Hurtgen and Brame’s concerns regarding the 
adequacy of representation by a coworker representative as being “wholly 
speculative.”243  Brame countered this contention by alleging that “it seems 
more speculative . . . to assume that a lone individual, selected on the spur of 
the moment, will advance the interests of the unit.”244  Indeed, Brame points 
out that under the majority’s holding an employee is free to choose any 
coworker to act as a representative, including someone involved in the 
dispute.245 
 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. at *4 n.11. 
 237. Id. at *28 n.94.  It is clear from Brame’s opinion that he views this response as an artful 
dodge.  “[The majority’s] argument does not even begin to answer the question posed.”  Id. 
 238. Id.  Van De Water noted as much when he observed that the Board’s holding in 
Materials Research would not require the employer the grant an employee’s request for a 
coworker’s presence when the employer wished to discuss such matters as pay or workings hours.  
Id. at 23. 
 239. Epilepsy Foundation, 2000 WL 967066, at *29. 
 240. Id.  See also Materials Research, 262 N.L.R.B. 1010, 1021 (1982). 
 241. Epilepsy Foundation, 2000 WL 967066, at *29. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. at *5. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Such was the case in Epilepsy Foundation, where employee Borgs requested the 
presence of Hasan, the co-author of the letter for which the meeting was being called to discuss.  
Id. at *2. 
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In conclusion, Brame summarized his position by stating that the factors 
relied upon to support the Court’s decision in Weingarten are not present in a 
nonunion environment.  As such, nonunion employers should not be burdened 
with the presence of an employee representative that will add little, if anything, 
to the process.246  Further, Brame maintained that “the NLRB [sic] itself 
forbids this result” in that it burdens the nonunion employer with the 
responsibility to “recognize a representative in a specific, limited, and 
apparently arbitrary situation on an employer that is otherwise free to deal with 
employees individually.”247 
IV.  WHERE THE BOARD WAS COMING FROM AND WHERE IT MAY BE GOING 
The 1990s were a difficult time for the Board.  High member turnover, 
long vacancies and budget cuts resulted in enormous backlogs and delays in 
decision-making.248  In total, there were fourteen members during the Clinton 
Administration making up eight Clinton Boards.249   Added to the Board’s high 
turnover rate is the fact that with the exception of eleven months between 
November 1997 and December 1999, the Board did not function with five 
confirmed members.250 
A. Overruling Precedent 
The revolving door at the N.L.R.B. makes any attempt at analyzing the 
Board’s decisional record onerous.  One statistic more conspicuous than 
others, however, is the fact that the Board overturned long-standing precedent 
in twenty-three cases since Truesdale became Chairman in December 1998.251  
Reversals are not new to the Board.  Truesdale was quick to point out that the 
Board’s record in 1998 was substantially lower than the Board’s all-time high 
of forty reversals that occurred in 1984-85.252  Understandably, Truesdale’s 
 
 246. Epilepsy Foundation, 2000 WL 967066, at *30. 
 247. Id. 
 248. See Wilma B. Liebman & Peter J. Hurtgen, The Clinton Board(s): A Partial Look From 
Within, 16 LAB. LAW. 43, 44 (2000); see also Susan J. McGolrick, N.L.R.B.: Fox, Hurtgen 
Discuss Board Turnover, Backlog, Changes in Modern Workplace, 1999 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) 
No. 100, at C-1 (May 25, 1999). 
 249. National Labor Relations Board Members, available at www.nlrb.gov/members.html 
(last visited Jan. 10, 2001).  The full term of an N.L.R.B. member is five years.  An individual 
may be chosen mid-term, but only for the remainder of the predecessor’s remaining term.  A 
member may also serve a recess appointment holding membership on the Board only until the 
end of the next session of the Senate.  See 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1994).  See also Liebman & 
Hurtgen, supra note 248, at 43. 
 250. See Andrew M. Kramer, The Clinton Labor Board: Difficult Times For A Management 
Representative, 16 LAB. LAW. 75, 75 (2000). 
 251. Susan J. McGolrick, Chairman Truesdale Plans to Keep Working Until Senate Confirms 
New President’s Choice, 2000 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 222, at AA-1 (Nov. 16, 2000). 
 252. Id. 
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record of twenty-three is a concern.253  Those who rely on the Board’s 
interpretation of the Act to either administer daily labor relations or to 
advocate for their clients who do, are left in a minefield of ever-changing 
rules.254 
The Board’s willingness to overturn longstanding rules seriously 
undermines the credibility of the agency that is charged with proffering rules, 
usually through adjudication rather than traditional rulemaking.255  The need 
for reasoned opinions communicating clear standards is critical if the Board is 
to be effective.256  Troubling, as well, is the fact that a number of cases have 
resulted in split decisions.257  The Board’s failure to demonstrate a unified 
front on several issues leaves the door open on those issues for future reversals, 
or possibly judicial review. 
While the general makeup of the Board can often be the cause of such an 
occurrence, such a convenient justification does not seem as likely, given the 
Board’s membership at the time.258  Indeed, the Truesdale Board, which was 
 
 253. Rep. John Boehner (R-Ohio) said as much at a hearing to discuss recent decisions by the 
N.L.R.B.: “One cannot look at the Board’s increasing tendency to ignore long-standing labor law 
and fail to be concerned.”  See Susan McGolrick, House Subcommittee Chair Questions Board 
Decisions Overturning Precedent, 2000 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 183, at A-9 (Sept. 20, 2000). 
 254. What seems even more troubling is the Board’s inclination to impose these new rules 
retroactively, as was the case in Epilepsy Foundation.  See supra note 220. 
 255. See National Labor Relations Board Publications, available at 
www.nlrb.gov/publications/first60yrs_entirepub.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2001). 
 256. See, Kramer supra note 250, at 100. 
 257. See, e.g., Jefferson Smurfit, 331 N.L.R.B. No. 80 (2000) (Members Fox, Hurtgen, Brame 
participating, Member Fox dissenting) (holding that an employer has no obligation to accept a 
card count as proof of majority status, unless there is a clear agreement between the parties to do 
so); SOS Staffing Services, 331 N.L.R.B. No. 97 (2000) (Members Fox, Hurtgen, Brame 
participating, Member Hurtgen dissenting) (ruling that the employer violated the Act by 
threatening not to hire union members and terminating a union organizer); Hacienda Hotel, Inc. 
Gaming Corp., 331 N.L.R.B. No. 89 (2000) (Chairman Truesdale, Members Fox, Liebman, 
Hurtgen, Brame participating, Members Fox and Liebman dissenting) (holding that the employer 
did not violate the Act when it unilaterally ceased checking off union dues after the expiration of 
the collective bargaining agreement); Lockheed Martin Corp., 331 N.L.R.B. No. 104 (2000) 
(Members Hurtgen, Brame, Liebman participating, Member Liebman dissenting) (overruling the 
union’s objections to the employer’s use of e-mails in a decertification election the union lost); 
Family Services Agency, 331 N.L.R.B. No. 103 (2000) (Chairman Truesdale, Hurtgen, Brame, 
Fox, Liebman participating, Chairman Truesdale dissenting) (finding that the potential for undue 
influence that exists with an employer’s use of a supervisor as an election observer does not arise 
when the supervisor serves as an observer for the union). 
 258. One might assume that the vast amount of reversals occurred during Gould’s tumultuous 
chairmanship.  Such was not the case.  See generally, Joan Flynn, “Expertness for what?”: The 
Gould Years at the N.L.R.B. and the Irrepressible Myth of the “Independent” Agency, 52 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 465 (2000).  But see Charles B. Craver, The Clinton Labor Board: Continuing A 
Tradition Of Moderation And Excellence, 16 LAB. LAW. 123, 124 (2000) (suggesting that Gould 
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touted as the “most balanced Board in years,”259 was comprised of two former 
union attorneys, two former management attorneys, and a long-time N.L.R.B. 
professional.260  Despite the lack of obvious motive, several may nonetheless 
be adduced. 
1. Declining Union Membership 
Although the number of employees represented by unions remained 
relatively constant in 1999 at 16.5 million (up from 16.2 million the year 
before),261 there is no question that union membership as a percentage of the 
number of workers has drastically declined.  In 1946, 14,322,000 workers were 
members of labor unions; by 1956, this number had exceeded 17,000,000.262 
This represented 35% of the workforce in both 1946 and 1956.263  In the 
1960s, labor unions’ growth started to slow.  Many large industries that were 
traditionally unionized were no longer expanding or were relocating their 
facilities to non-union states.264  By 1999, private sector unions represented 
only 9.4% of employees.265 
 
was neither a radical union supporter nor management supporter, but rather an “unequivocal 
supporter of employee rights.”). 
 259. See Rick Valliere, N.L.R.B.: N.L.R.B.  Has the Balance Required For Deciding 
Emerging Workplace Issues, Panel Agrees, 2000 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 05 at C-1 (Jan. 7, 
2000). 
 260. Member Peter J. Hurtgen and J. Robert Brame came to the Board after careers as 
management advocates.  Members Sarah M. Fox and Wilma B. Liebman were former union 
attorneys.  Chairman John Truesdale has spent a majority of his career with the N.L.R.B.  This 
balanced representation, in and of itself, is a marked change in that Board members are usually 
cut from two cloths, labor lawyers from management practices and government careerists.  See 
Flynn, supra note 258, at 471.  Of the twenty-six Board members appointed since 1970, eleven 
came from labor law private practice on the management side with twelve coming from career 
government employment.  Id. at 471 n.28.  Only Member Margaret Browning, who served from 
1994 until her death in 1997, was appointed to the Board directly from union-side practice.  Id. at 
471 n.30.  See also N.L.R.B.: Member Margaret A. Browning Dies of Cancer at Age 46, 1997 
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 41 at A-10 (Mar. 3, 1997).  Betty Murphy, appointed in 1975, had an 
unusual background with a firm that represented international unions as well as management 
clients.  Members Sarah Fox and Wilma Liebman, as previously stated, spent much of their 
careers as union lawyers but were working in the public sector at the time of their appointments.  
Id. 
 261. See Daniel J. Roy, Unions: Number of Union Members Rose Slightly in 1999, but 
Percentage Remained Constant, 2000 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 13 at AA-1 (Jan. 20, 2000). 
 262. See also Charles B. Craver, Mandatory Worker Participation is Required in a Declining 
Union Environment to Provide Employees With Meaningful Industrial Democracy, 66 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 135, 136-37 (1997). 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. at 137 (noting that many companies were migrating from the Snow Belt states to the 
Sun Belt areas of the South and Southwest). 
 265. See Roy, supra note 261. 
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While shrinking union percentages can be attributed to several things, the 
most notable is the shift in the workforce from blue to white collar.266  The 
new global economy, which is powered by technology, is not as conducive to 
collective bargaining as were the traditional, labor-intensive manufacturing and 
production industries.267  Modern employees are highly trained and highly 
skilled and not as inclined to become union members.268  In addition, many 
employers are providing personnel rules and human resource policies similar 
to those found in unionized environments, thus reducing further the desire of 
employees to join labor unions. 
Market trends and employment practices are evolving significantly faster 
than labor laws.269  Employers are experimenting with new workplace concepts 
such as telecommuting and flexible schedules.  These are concepts that the 
framers of the Act could not have fathomed.  This changing work environment 
may have contributed, in part, to the Board’s decision to uproot existing labor 
policies in several decisions. 
In Boston Medical Center. Corp.,270 the Board reversed a twenty-three-
year precedent to hold that interns and residents at the Medical Center 
constituted covered “employees” rather than unprotected “students.”271  The 
Board stated that changes in health care have made interns and residents a 
more critical component of providing health care in hospitals.272  While vast 
changes in the medical field cannot be denied, Hurtgen’s dissenting opinion 
 
 266. Jim Barlow, Blue Collars Fading to White, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Mar. 8, 1992, at 1.  
By the year 2010, it is estimated that only 10%, and possibly as little as 5%, of the workforce will 
be blue collar. 
 267. See Liebman & Hurtgen, supra note 248, at 46. 
 268. Id.  See also Barlow, supra note 266 (stating: “[W]orker’s don’t cotton to union 
contracts, which reward everyone in a particular job with the same salary and raises, regardless of 
individual effort.”). 
 269. See Susan J. McGolrick, Chairman Truesdale Plans to Keep Working Until Senate 
Confirms New President’s Choice, 2000 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 222, at AA-1 (Nov. 16, 
2000) (noting Member Fox’s statement that in all but a few cases where precedent was overruled 
the Board was presented with new issues and developments).  See also Liebman & Hurtgen, 
supra note 248, at 47 (stating that traditional notion of labor “no longer fits many of the 
employment relationships of the 21st century.”). 
 270. 330 N.L.R.B. No. 30 (1999).  The majority consisted of Chairman Truesdale and 
Members Liebman and Fox. Hurtgen and Brame dissented. 
 271. This decision has the potential to affect some 90,000 individuals who worked for private 
hospitals.  See Michelle Amber, Health Care Employees: N.L.R.B. Rules That Interns and 
Residents at Boston Medical Center are Employees, 1999 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 229 at AA-
1 (Nov. 30, 1999). 
 272. Boston Med. Ctr. Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. No. 30 at *15.  The Board noting that 80% of 
intern’s time is spent caring for patients.  The fact that residents and intern learn on the job does 
not exempt them from the Act’s definition of “employee.” 
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noted that the only thing that has changed with regards to the status of interns 
and residents is the make-up of the Board.273 
Similarly, the Board expanded the definition of employee in New York 
University.274  In this case, a unanimous Board275 overturned its previous 
holdings that graduate assistants were considered students and are therefore 
exempt under Section 2(3) of the Act.276  The Board’s holding makes New 
York University the first private university in the United States to have union-
represented teaching assistants.277 
In M.B. Sturgis, Inc., the Board held that employees obtained from a labor 
supplier, (such as a temporary employment service), may be included in the 
same bargaining unit as the permanent employees of the employer to which 
they are assigned, without the consent of the employers.278  In so holding, the 
Board overruled its 1990 decision in Lee Hospital279 in which it held that 
bargaining units that include both regular employees and temporary workers 
 
 273. Id. at *30.  Hurtgen condemned the majority’s decision, stating that an agency has the 
power to change its rules and policies only if there are changes in circumstances.  See In re 
Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 784 (1968).  See also N.L.R.B. v. Majestic 
Weaving Co., 355 F.2d 854, 860 (2d Cir. 1966). 
 274. New York University, 332 N.L.R.B. No. 111 (2000). 
 275. Chairman Truesdale and Members Liebman and Hurtgen took part in this decision.  
Hurtgen, who dissented in Boston Medical, distinguished the graduate teaching assistants from 
hospital residents and interns by noting that unlike graduate assistants, the work performed by 
medical residents and interns is a “necessary and fundamental part of their education.”  New York 
University, 332 N.L.R.B. No. 111, at *8.  See also, Susan J. McGolrick, Representation 
Elections: N.L.R.B. Adopts Regional Director’s Ruling That NYU Graduate Assistants May 
Organize, 2000 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 213 at AA-1 (Nov. 2, 2000). 
 276. New York University, 332 N.L.R.B. No. 11, at *3.  Section 2(3) states in relevant part: 
“The term ‘employee’ shall include any employee . . . [unless the Act explicitly states 
otherwise] . . . but shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the 
domestic service of any family or person at his home, or any individual employed by his parent or 
spouse, or any individual employed as an independent contractor . . . .”  29 U.S.C. § 152 (1994).  
The New York University Board held that ample evidence existed to find that graduate assistants 
plainly and literally fall within the meaning of “employee” as defined in Section 2(3). 
 277. See Susan J. McGolrick, Representation Elections: N.L.R.B. Adopts Regional Director’s 
Ruling That NYU Graduate Assistants May Organize, 2000 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 213 at 
AA-1 (Nov. 2, 2000). 
 278. 331 N.L.R.B. No. 173 (2000).  The majority was comprised of Chairman Truesdale and 
Members Fox and Liebman. Brame was the lone dissenter with Hurtgen recusing himself from 
this case.  See Susan J. McGolrick, Contingent Workers: N.L.R.B. 3-1 Allows Certain Bargaining 
Units Including Both Temporary, Regular Workers, 2000 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 170 at AA-
1 (Aug. 31, 2000). 
 279. Nos. 14-RC-11572 and 9-UC-406, 2000 WL 1274024 (N.L.R.B. Aug. 25, 2000). 
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are multiemployer bargaining units and require the consent of the 
employers.280 
In all three of the aforementioned cases, employee’s rights to organize 
were significantly expanded. This sudden expansion has left many 
commentators perplexed, if not hostile.281  Union expansion may not be the 
only concern being addressed by the Board. 
2. An Unresponsive Legislature 
The Board’s sudden propensity for disregarding its own precedent may 
also be in response to federal and state legislatures’ failure to enact measures 
safeguarding employee’s rights.  The first such proposal was the Model 
Employment Termination Act (META) of 1991.282  Drafted by Uniform Law 
Commissioners, META was designed to protect workers from arbitrary 
discharge by amending the “at will” doctrine to require discharge only for just 
cause.283  The measure, which provides a definition of just cause284 and 
mandates the use of arbitration for disputes,285 has not been adopted by any 
state.286 
 
 280. In his dissent, Brame argued that such bargaining units constitute multiemployer units 
under Section 9(b) of the Act in that although these employees are all performing work for the 
same employer, they do not have the same employer.  Id. at *32. 
 281. See Perkins Coie, N.L.R.B. Goes On Rampage Against It’s Own Precedent, 6 OR. 
EMPLOYMENT L. LETTER, 7 (2000) (“Because the composition of the N.L.R.B. changes with the 
incumbent administration, reversals of precedent are not uncommon.  Those cases illustrate the 
perspective of the current Board majority and how it is willing to change the rules to help unions 
organize.  The bottom line: beware.  The rules are subject to change, and the only thing that is 
certain is that they are likely to change in favor of unions rather than you.”).  See also generally 
Kramer, supra note 250. 
 282. See The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, available at 
www.nccusl.org/uniformact_summaries/uniformacts-s-meta.htm (last visited January 12, 2001). 
 283. See Wrongful Discharge: Adoption of Model Termination Act ‘Win-Win’ Proposition, 
A.C.L.U. Director Says, 1995 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 20 at D-12 (Jan. 31, 1995) (stating that 
META would guarantee minimum rights against wrongful discharge while reducing potential 
liability for employers).  For a history of the At-Will Doctrine see Jeanne Duquette Gorr, The 
Model Employment Termination Act: Fruitful Seed or Noxious Weed?, 31 DUQ. L. REV. 111, 112 
(1992); see also Dawn S. Perry, Deterring Egregious Violations Of Public Policy: A Proposed 
Amendment To The Model Employment Termination Act, 66 WASH. L. REV. 915 (1992). 
 284. “Good cause” is defined in META as one of two things: one, the employee’s inadequate 
or improper conduct in the performance of the job; and two, if economic or institutional goals of 
the employer mandate a reduction in force.  See supra note 282. 
 285. Id.  See also Perry, supra note 283, at 922-23. 
 286. See Perry, supra note 283, at 915 n.4 (noting that while not adopting META, Montana 
became the first and only state to legislatively prohibit wrongful discharge). 
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Another legislative initiative that was met with resistance was the 
Teamwork for Employees and Managers Act (TEAM) of 1997,287 which would 
have amended Section 8(a)(2) of the Act.288  The proposal would have given 
employers the ability to establish what labor opponents termed labor-
management cooperative programs and what labor advocates viewed as 
company-dominated labor unions.289 
President Clinton vetoed the bill,290 saying that “rather than promoting 
genuine teamwork, [the bill] would undermine the system of collective 
bargaining that has served this country so well for many decades.”291  Clinton 
noted that today’s labor laws allow for cooperative workplace initiatives such 
as the creation of quality circles, work teams and programs designed to solicit 
employee suggestions and criticisms regarding a variety of workplace 
issues.292 
The failure of any state to pass META, and the Presidential veto of the 
TEAM Act may serve to reinforce the conviction that if nonunion workers are 
to be protected, the responsibility to do so lies with the Board.293  Such a 
notion may perhaps explain the expansions of the Act promulgated by the 
Board. 
B. The Implications of Epilepsy Foundation 
1. Who, What, When and Why? 
In deciding to extend Weingarten beyond the union sector, the Epilepsy 
Board left many questions unanswered, including who is entitled to this added 
protection.  The Board held that any employee fearful that a meeting with 
management will likely result in discipline may request a coworker’s presence.  
What about a meeting to discuss absenteeism when the employee is not subject 
 
 287. See Employee Participation, Senate Panel Hears From Labor, Business On Passage of 
TEAM Act, 1997 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 30 at E-1 (Feb. 13, 1997); S. 295, 104th Cong. 
(1996). 
 288. Section 8(a)(2) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to “dominate or 
interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization.”  29 U.S.C. § 158 
(1994). 
 289. See Clinton Vetoes TEAM Act Despite Please For Passage, 152 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 
417 at D-19 (Aug. 5 1996). 
 290. H.R. 743, 104th Cong. (1996); S. 295, 105th Cong. (1997). 
 291. Id.  The legislation had narrowly passed the House by a vote of 221-202 and by 53-43 in 
the Senate.  This narrow margin of support was insufficient to override President Clinton’s veto.  
Id. 
 292. Id.  Clinton also recognized that 96% of all large employers have employee involvement 
teams.  Id.  See also Craver, supra note 262, at 142. 
 293. See Morris, supra note 177, at 1676 (contending that because so many more nonunion 
companies exist today compared to union companies, the Board’s presence is more important to 
nonunion establishments and their employees than ever before). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2001] UNION RIGHTS, NO DUES 1345 
to discipline at that time but may be in the future if the problem persists? 
Consider also a meeting to discuss a mediocre job evaluation where the 
employee is not going to be disciplined at that time but may be subject to 
disciplinary action down the line.  Would these employees be within their 
statutory rights to refuse to meet with the employer without a coworker 
present? 
The Board’s failure to state how an employee representative is to be 
chosen implies that the employee is free to choose whomever they want.294  
How does an employer protect the privacy of the alleged victim and alleged 
harasser if one or the other demands a coworker’s presence in the meeting? 
How is an employer to handle situations such as sexual harassment where it 
may be the employer’s desire to interview employees separately to avoid 
collusion?295  Under Title VII, the employer can be held liable for not 
addressing a sexual harassment complaint,296 but under Epilepsy Foundation, 
the employer may be precluded from taking the necessary steps to remedy the 
problem because it cannot discover all the facts. 
Other questions seemingly left open concern employer obligations.  For 
example, is an employer required to grant paid time off to employees acting as 
employee representatives?297  Should an employer have a policy for notifying 
their employees about these newfound rights?298  What are the employer’s 
obligations with regards to notifying the employee in advance that the meeting 
may lead to disciplinary action?  Do employer’s have an obligation to 
 
 294. See Susan J. McGolrick, Employee Rights: Attorneys Disagree About Wisdom of 
N.L.R.B. Extending Weingarten, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 152, at C-1 (Aug. 7, 2000) 
(assuming that extending Weingarten rights to nonunion employees also means extending the 
same limitations.  For example, employees do not have the right to insist on a coworker 
representative who is not present at work at the time of the meeting, they cannot bring in an 
attorney or any other non-employee as a representative).  See also supra note 46 and 
accompanying text. 
 295. McGolrick, supra note 294, at C-1. 
 296. See, e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc., 524 U.S. 742, 756 (1998) (noting that an employer may 
be liable for the existence of a hostile sexual work environment caused by another employee). 
 297. See Torzewski, supra note 46.  The author, analyzing the dissenting opinions in 
Weingarten, notes many of these same concerns.  For instance, noting that Justices Powell and 
Stewart’s position that the majority’s opinion would undoubtedly extend to nonunion settings, the 
author propounded a concern as to how a representative would be selected by a nonunion 
employee seeking representation.  Employers, the author contended, would likely be required to 
provide new rules governing an employee’s ability to leave his job area in order to provide 
employee representation.  Id. at 324. 
 298. At this time there is no requirement that employers notify their employees of their 
Weingarten rights.  See supra note 294 and accompanying text.  See also ROBERT M. SCHWARTZ, 
THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF UNION STEWARDS 79-80 (1994) “Employers have no obligations to 
inform employees of their rights to union representation.  This is the union’s job.”  But see 
McGolrick, supra note 294 (encouraging employers to notify employees of these new rights 
through employee handbooks or meetings as a sign of good faith on the part of the employer). 
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“Weingartenize” employees prior to an investigatory meeting?  These 
questions will likely remain unanswered until the Board is presented with these 
issues. 
2. The Board’s Case Load—Here We Go Again 
The failure to delineate clear guidelines in Epilepsy Foundation governing 
these types of situations will necessitate a case-by-case handling of these 
issues, likely resulting in future challenges reaching the Board.  One must 
question the prudence of the Board making decisions that expand their 
jurisdiction even further. 
“As the Board moves into 21st century, it is still trying to finish the work 
of the 20th century.”299  The N.L.R.B.’s backlog reached its pinnacle in 1984 
when the Board had 1647 cases awaiting review.300  As of February 1999 that 
number had dropped to 733 with many cases waiting over two years to be 
heard.301  Member Hurtgen noted that ideally all cases should be decided 
within one year, barring excessively lengthy records.302 
As an agency of limited means with a large pending backlog, it seems that 
the Board may be spreading itself even thinner.  A valid argument may be 
made that the lack of Board resources does not justify denying employees their 
rights under the Act.  It may also be argued, however, that the Board 
overturning long-standing precedent that results in the expansion of the 
Board’s jurisdiction is unjust to the employees, the unions and the employers 
involved in the 700 cases awaiting attention by the Board. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Epilepsy Foundation decision has the potential to extend traditional, 
albeit limited, union type coverage to millions of employees who have not 
certified a labor organization.  While there is no question that Section 7 of the 
Act safeguards an employee’s right to act in concert for mutual aid and 
protection, the analysis does not stop there for nonunion employees. 
If these employees wish to be afforded the benefits of unionism, they may 
do so by certifying a union.  In the absence of a union, the employer is free to 
deal with employees on an individual basis.  These bright-line rules should not 
 
 299. Susan McGolrick, N.L.R.B.: Fox, Hurtgen Discuss Board Turnover, Backlog, Changes 
in Modern Workplace, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 100, at C-1 (May 25, 1999). 
 300. John C. Truesdale, Battling Case Backlogs at the N.L.R.B.: The Continuing Problem of 
Delays In Decision Making and the Clinton Board’s Response, 16 LAB. LAW. 1 (2000). 
 301. Id. at 2.  An audit conducted by the executive secretary in March 1999 revealed that 74 
representation cases had been pending for over two years and 72 unfair labor practice cases would 
be three years old by the end of 1999. 
 302. See. e.g., Avondale Indus., 329 N.L.R.B. No. 93 (1999).  Avondale’s hearing transcript 
was more than 40,000 pages long, with an ALJ decision comprised of 650 pages.  Truesdale, 
supra note 300, at 3. 
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be clouded by the Board’s extension of a traditional union right to nonunion 
employees.  By doing so, the Board has unquestionably opened a Pandora’s 
box of arguments that other rights historically enjoyed by union members 
exclusively should now be extended to nonunion employees. 
While it is likely that the Sixth Circuit will uphold the Epilepsy 
Foundation decision as a permissible interpretation of the Act,303 the wisdom 
of doing so should be considered.  Whether intentionally or not, the Board has 
spread its protective mantle over an enlarged population and the likely result 
will be an increased caseload addressing not only violations of the Epilepsy 
Foundation decision, but also numerous issues left unanswered by the Epilepsy 
Board.  At a time when the Board is coming to grips with its case backlog, it 
seems ill-advised for the Board to take on more than it can handle. 
In its sixty-fifth year, the Board has its hands full trying to apply the Act to 
the workplace of the new millennium.  While overturning precedent may be 
necessary, the Board’s penchant for reversing long-standing authority weakens 
their reputation as a cohesive agency expert in the area of labor law.  This begs 
the question as to what extent the Board should be given deference by courts.  
When the only thing constant at the Board is change, both management and 
labor will find little guidance from Board rulings and feel little comfort relying 
on what may become known as “decisions de jour.” 
LADAWN L. OSTMANN* 
 
 303. Reversal on appeal may be unlikely since the Board’s decision will likely be found to 
have drawn its essence from the Act. 
* J.D. Candidate, Saint Louis University School of Law, 2002; M.S.I.R., Loyola University of 
Chicago, Institute of Human Resources and Industrial Relations, 1997; B.S.B.A., Lindenwood 
College, 1990.  This Note is dedicated to Douglas Bobillo and Irene Mullenschlader, mentors and 
friends. 
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